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What Property Does
Christopher Serkin *
For centuries, scholars have wrestled with seemingly intractable
problems about the nature of property. This Article offers a different approach.
Instead of asking what property is, it asks what property does. And it argues
that property protects people’s reliance on resources by moderating the pace of
change. Modern scholarly accounts emphasize voluntary transactions as the
source and purpose of reliance in property. Such “transactional reliance”
implies strong, stable, and enduring rights. This Article argues that property
law also reflects a very different source of reliance on resources, one that rises
and falls simply with the passage of time. This new category of “evolutionary
reliance” is at the heart of core property doctrines like adverse possession, waste,
and the rule against perpetuities. Focusing on evolutionary reliance reveals a
new vision of property, not as a bundle of sticks or a bare right to exclude, but
instead as a nexus of competing and dynamic reliance interests that can change
over time. This new vision has important conceptual and doctrinal
consequences for common law doctrines and the Takings Clause, and it
highlights the surprising dynamism and change in property.
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INTRODUCTION
Few legal categories are simultaneously as familiar and as
opaque as property. The distinct categories “mine” and “yours” are deepseated if not innate. 1 The accessibility of the property intuition is
supposed to be a large part of its power, giving rise to claims of right
that are easy to identify and that command respect. 2 However, the
category of property is fiercely contested. Positivists disagree with

1.
See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, The Possession Heuristic, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 150–52 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (discussing evolutionary biology
in relation to the origins of property). More colloquially, this is captured in common phrases like
“My home is my castle.” See Jeannine Bell, The Fair Housing Act and Extralegal Terror, 41 IND.
L. REV. 537, 540 (2008) (describing the racist history of the phrase); Rocket Mortgage, Jason
(Feb.
2,
2020),
Momoa
Super
Bowl
Commercial,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2ERWFMLptw [https://perma.cc/2655-G2RN] (describing his
home as his sanctuary).
2.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 38–40 (2000).
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natural rights theorists about the source of rights. 3 Lawyers call
property a bundle of rights, and then argue about which—if any—of
those rights are fundamental. 4 And those conflicts generate meaningful
disagreements over core property doctrines: what resources to
characterize as property; 5 how property constrains regulations like
environmental protections and land use controls; 6 how to protect the
right to exclude; 7 and many others. These are often ontological
disagreements over the very nature of property itself. 8 As a
foundational source of rights, its internal logic is surprisingly
mysterious. 9
This Article offers a different approach. Instead of asking what
property is, it asks what property does. 10 This Article argues that
property law serves an underappreciated purpose: protecting reliance
on resources by favoring slow changes over fast ones in the evolution of
property rights. Property, in this view, is a stabilizing but not ossifying
force. It reflects the familiar psychological phenomenon that rapid
changes are especially disruptive. 11 Across a number of doctrines,
3.
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L.
REV. 413 (2017) (offering a natural rights theory of property); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 543–50 (2005) (characterizing the
field).
4.
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 545 n.85 (describing history of the “bundle
of sticks” account of property).
5.
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990) (refusing to
recognize property rights in body parts); REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA
LACKS (2010) (describing development of HeLa cells and the lack of property protection for the
original patient from whom they were developed).
6.
See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause,
42 VT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) (identifying property rights and regulatory power as effectively zerosum).
7.
See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275 (2008) (critiquing the right); Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON.
J. WATCH 255 (2011) (summarizing criticisms of the conception of property as a right to exclude);
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002) (contrasting the exclusion strategy with the governing strategy).
8.
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 533–35 (discussing the nature of
property).
9.
Cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“There is nothing which so generally
strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property . . . . And
yet there are very few that will give themselves the trouble to consider the origin and foundation
of this right.”).
10. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2019)
(offering a functional account of property). For another example of this kind of approach, see CAROL
ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP 3 (1994), assigning to Bentham the view that “property is designed to do something,
and what it is supposed to do is to tap individual energies in order to make us all more prosperous.”
11. See, e.g., KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & MAXWELL PALMER,
NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 34 (2020)
(“[R]apid changes are especially psychologically salient.”); Holly Doremus, Takings and
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property facilitates changes in reliance on resources that happen
gradually over time while resisting changes that are sudden or abrupt.
Rules governing adverse possession, the changed conditions doctrine in
servitudes, and many others reveal a hidden dynamism animating
property law while also minimizing disruptions by ensuring that
changes occur slowly. Change is not in tension with property but is
essential to it. 12
This Article offers a new synthetic account of property as serving
the fundamental purpose of protecting reliance. It also frames a new set
of questions. Whose reliance interests should the law protect at any
moment? 13 How much reliance is necessary to produce property’s many
benefits? And how much time do people need to adjust their
expectations in order to accommodate shifting entitlements? These are
the inquiries that should inform the substance of property rights. But
this requires reevaluating some of the assumptions about the source
and role of property in the legal system today.
At the highest level of generality, the institution of property
allows people to rely on resources in the world, whether land, chattels,
or incorporeal resources like intellectual property. 14 But what is the
source of reliance in property and whose reliance does it protect? During
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, answers to those
questions have most often been supplied by law and economics with
reference to voluntary transactions. 15 People acquire property through
contracts, gifts, inheritance, and so forth. And property persists so that
people internalize the costs and benefits of ownership, helping to ensure
that resources will be put to their most productive or valuable use. 16
Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 22 (2003) (“Cognitive psychology tells us that, as a rule,
people seek to limit change.”); see also DAVID A. NADLER, ROBERT B. SHAW, A. ELISE WALTON &
ASSOCIATES, DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE: LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION 14–33 (1995)
(observing that the more rapid a change, the more traumatic, painful, and demanding it will be on
an individual).
12. Cf. Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law,
98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1632 (1989) (“Where institutionalized law exists, it claims for itself many formal
roles in managing normative change.”). But see Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The
Constitutional Conundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2034–35 (2013) (arguing that property is
inherently protective of the status quo and therefore in tension with legal change).
13. Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 637
(1988) (“It is old-fashioned, misleading and unproductive to identify a single ‘owner’ of valued
resources when control of those resources has been divided by law or contract among several
interested parties.”).
14. See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L.
REV. 463, 466 (2007) (“[Property law] is typically understood as an institution whose very identity
and purpose is intimately associated with the task of promoting stability . . . .”).
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3–6 (1960) (invoking the
Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher to illustrate how bargaining maximizes wealth
enhancement by internalizing externalities); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited,
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Property serves this purpose by creating stability in the service of
alienability and owner control.
Property in this view starts with some original acquisition based
on first-in-time claims and then extends forward in time through
voluntary transactions that become the basis for—and purpose of—
ownership. 17 While seldom explicit, the standard property curriculum
in law school follows precisely this path, beginning with original
acquisition (conquest, capture, creation), and then covering the rules
protecting prior possession (chain of title, lost-and-found, recordation),
before turning to rules governing the unbundling and re-bundling of
property rights between people and across time (estates and future
interests, concurrent interests, leaseholds). 18 From this perspective,
property provides the building blocks of welfare-enhancing
transactions; its animating purpose is to create stable and strong rights
to resources around which people can then interact and contract.
This Article agrees that property rights protect reliance on
resources. However, for every doctrine like trespass that protects
ownership and prior possession, there is another like adverse
possession that promotes dynamism, recognizing that reliance can shift
through means other than voluntary transactions. 19 This Article
therefore offers a new account of property’s internal logic. It argues that
property is best understood as protecting people’s reliance on resources
but reveals how reliance often arises through organic, evolutionary
processes that the law ultimately protects. Property law, then, is best
understood as mediating between competing reliance interests that can
change over time. 20
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85, 92 (1985) (“Wealth is maximized by creating a system
which allows offer and asking prices to be compared . . . . [Therefore], it is necessary to have a way
of deciding who may charge an asking price and who must make offers; this is a question about
property rights.”).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine that “First in Time Is First in
Right,” 64 NEB. L. REV. 349 (1985).
18. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY, at xi–xxiii (9th ed. 2018) (casebook table of contents);
JOSEPH WILLIAMS SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & EDUARDO MOISÉS
PEÑALVER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at xv–xxviii (7th ed. 2017) (same).
19. See Sarah E. Hammill, Enduring Trespass: What Adverse Possession Reveals About
Property, 96 SUP. CT. L. REV. 215, 231 (2021) (“Adverse possession suggests that property
entitlements only seem to be fixed and enduring, that the reality is they can and do change as time
passes.”); cf. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 357 (Tony Tanner ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1988)
(1851) (finding opposing pressures in the rules of acquisition and asking rhetorically, “And what
are you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?”). For discussion of specific doctrines, see
infra Part II.
20. For leading accounts of reliance at the heart of property, see, for example, Singer, supra
note 13; Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 444 (2011); and Laura S.
Underkuffler, Individual Reliance and Government Forbearance: A Tale of Five Cases, 3 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 141 (2014). Cf. Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE
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Property’s temporality is its most undertheorized defining
feature. 21 Stable property rights allow people to make choices and
pursue long-term goals. 22 What fundamentally distinguishes a mere
license from the full-blown property right of an easement, and what
distinguishes mere possession from property, is stability over time and
the resulting ability of the owner to rely on property’s persistence. For
people to be future-regarding, there must be some resources on which
they can rely. 23 As Charles Beitz explained, “The fact that the successful
exercise of self-determination is an intertemporal achievement means
that there will be circumstances in which we have an interest in
security of possession over time.” 24 Similarly, for property to carve out
a sphere of ordered liberty, people must be able to rely on its protection
into the future. 25 Momentary possession is not enough to produce
property’s benefits. 26 From either a conceptual or instrumental
perspective, property must be durable.

L. REV. 55, 81 (2009) (“Temporal inertia is law’s core attribute. It ensures the systemic stability of
law because one primary purpose of law is to provide stable rules that do not change over a period
of time . . . .”).
21. See Charles R. Beitz, Property and Time, 26 J. POL. PHIL. 419, 419 (2018) (“It is an
interesting if neglected question in modern theories of property why we should care about the
temporal extension of property protection.”); Hammill, supra note 19, at 231 (“[T]he role of time is
often absent from much theorizing about property.”). There are other leading works that explicitly
acknowledge property’s temporal dimension. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 174 (2000) (“[Property rights] must be redefined over time to
prevent the illegitimate concentration of power in ways that keep individuals from participating
in the market system on fair and equal terms.”); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The
Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986); Margaret Jane Radin,
Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 741 (1986) (“[T]ime is embedded in the
heart of rule-utilitarianism.”). Cf. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 37, 38 (1990) (“[D]iscussions
of property at some point take a striking turn toward a narrative or ‘diachronic’ explanatory mode,”
where time and cumulative experience play essential roles.).
22. See Beitz, supra note 21, at 419; HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 64
(2021) (“Indeed, the temporal extension, which typifies property rights, follows quite closely from
property’s autonomy-enhancing telos.”).
23. José Brunner, Modern Times: Law, Temporality and Happiness in Hobbes, Locke and
Bentham, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 277, 302 (2006) (“[F]or the durable protection of property
allows humans to have rational expectations, i.e. to live fully as [the] future-oriented creatures
that they are.”).
24. Beitz, supra note 21, at 427; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 115
(C. K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 2d prtg. 1950) (1789)
(“Everything which I possess . . . I consider in my own mind as destined always to belong to me. I
make it the basis of my expectations, and of the hopes of those dependent upon me, and I form my
plan of life accordingly.”); DAGAN, supra note 22, at 1 (arguing that property is concerned with
“self-authorship, ensuring to all of us as free and equal individuals the possibility of writing and
rewriting our own life stories”).
25. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (3d ed. 2008).
26. Beitz, supra note 21, at 427 (“Our capacity to act successfully as planning agents depends
on having secure, intertemporal control of the things required for the success of our plans.”).
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Property rights do not have to be permanent and immutable,
however, to create the benefits of owner reliance and control. Numerous
and familiar property doctrines implicitly recognize the ways in which
people’s reliance on underlying resources can shift, from the changed
conditions doctrine in covenants, to the law of accretion, to the “coming
to the nuisance” defense. 27 This Article argues that these doctrines are
expressions of the dynamism running through property. 28 Property
ensures stability over time, but not too much stability.
Methodologically, this Article is interpretivist. 29 It identifies
reliance on resources as the core animating purpose of property. But it
demonstrates that this reliance can arise either through transactions
or through repetition over time—what the Article calls “evolutionary
reliance.” It then identifies specific doctrines that would benefit from
incorporating this focus on scalar or incremental change.
This Article therefore provides a new vision of property, not as a
collection of discrete sticks in a bundle of rights, but instead as the locus
of a web of competing reliance interests—between property owners,
between owners and nonowners, and between owners and the State—
none of which are necessarily static. 30 Property law ensures that rules
and expectations shift gradually and that people are given time to adapt
to those changes. 31 The role that property serves in the legal system is
to protect reasonable reliance by constraining the pace of change.
The Article is both positive and prescriptive. It examines, first,
neoliberal claims that have dominated property for much of the
twentieth century, with a focus on stability and owner control. But it
then demonstrates all the ways that property’s stability is tempered
with dynamism and how property law moderates the pace at which
reliance on resources changes over time. This claim is largely groundup and inductive, and the evidence comes from the substantive content
of existing property law and theory. Prescriptively, the Article shows
27. See infra Parts II & III (considering these and other doctrines).
28. Nestor Davidson has also usefully identified property’s dynamism in the context of the
Takings Clause. See Davidson, supra note 20.
29. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO L.J.
489, 489–90 (2020) (distinguishing between “interpretivist” and “functionalist” theories of private
law, and arguing that interpretivists seek to understand the “law from within and evaluat[e] it in
terms of the coherence of the morality immanent in the law itself”).
30. Tony Arnold has also offered a similar characterization of property, usefully
distinguishing a “web of interests” from the more traditional “bundle of sticks” metaphor. See Craig
Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 281, 332 (2002). His work did not focus on reliance, however, but instead on more
general connections between people and resources. Nevertheless, this Article embraces the same
formulation.
31. Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 2028 (“[The Takings Clause] seeks to protect individual
property from radical changes in the status quo . . . .”).
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how focusing on the pace of change generates specific and important
doctrinal payoffs. 32 Some are justificatory, like explaining adverse
possession. But some require reforming existing doctrine to ensure that
property will continue to serve the central goal of mediating between
stability and dynamism over time.
To highlight just a few of the implications that are then
canvassed more thoroughly in Part III, this theory offers a new gloss on
nuisance law and on the “coming to the nuisance” defense, suggesting
that the rate of change in the surrounding area should be an important
consideration in allocating property rights. It provides a new
justification for the changed conditions doctrine in the law of covenants,
suggesting that courts often overprotect real covenants and equitable
servitudes. The most important payoff comes at the intersection of
property rights and public law, particularly in the law of regulatory
takings and legal transitions. It provides a new framework for
evaluating whether and when legal change interferes too much with
settled reliance interests by focusing on the passage of time.
It is easy to anticipate two broad objections. First, change is
sometimes sudden and dramatic. 33 The introduction of new
environmental laws, landlord-tenant rules, or new land use regulations
can all happen swiftly, reflecting a rapid change in our understanding
of the world or dramatic shifts in society’s views about the appropriate
use of property. Often, these are some of the most important leaps
forward for society. 34 The theory offered here—locating reliance
interests at the heart of property—operates as a check on such change
in ways that may be normatively problematic. Indeed, this theory of
property seems inherently conservative in its focus on protecting the
status quo simply for the sake of stability. On the other hand, some may
object that property is more protective than this theory suggests—that
allowing incremental change is nothing more than death by a thousand
cuts and the slow drip-drip erosion of rights. Property, for some, is a
more permanent bulwark against regulatory intervention and legal
evolution, and the passage of time should not be allowed to eat it all
away. 35
32. See infra Part III.
33. For discussion of the difference between avulsion and accretion, see infra Part II.B.
34. See, e.g., Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution: Observations on
the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793, 795 (2013) (“Viewed
through the lens of property law—with its unwavering focus on certainty and consistency—
recognition of the implied warranty of habitability in the late 1960s and early 1970s seems too
radical to believe.”).
35. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222, 1243 (2009) (“A number of courts have held that an amortization period is nothing
but a deferred taking of property.”).
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Both are serious objections, but the fact that they represent
opposite concerns highlights the value of the account of property offered
here. Yes, some may worry that focusing on reliance is too protective,
and others that it is not protective enough. Indeed, adherents of both
camps will find much to dislike. But this account offers a new way of
balancing the competing needs for dynamism and stability in the law
and a framework for evaluating how the two trade off against each other
in any particular context.
Indeed, this approach disarms some of the weaponization of
property in contemporary political discourse. Many conservatives
believe that the modern regulatory state runs roughshod over property
rights and fear that the logical extension of expansive views of state
power is the elimination of private property as a meaningful category. 36
Many liberals see the invocation of property rights as an attempt to
prohibit redistributive policies; protecting property rights necessarily
means protecting the existing allocation of resources and thus stands
in the way of efforts to reduce inequality. 37 They worry that protecting
property rights limits or prohibits environmental and other regulations
that advance the public interest but that burden private property. This
is a high-stakes fight, affecting the political palatability and also the
constitutionality of a wide swath of the regulatory state. 38 Focusing on
the pace of change reveals a narrow middle path. It reassures
conservatives that property is a meaningful constraint on change. But
it should reassure liberals that protecting property does not mean
locking in the status quo. There are many opportunities to change
property rights without disrupting settled reliance interests because of
the ways in which property already changes dynamically over time.
Part I discusses the conventional view of property as promoting
stable reliance interests and argues that most conventional accounts of
property focus on reliance arising out of—and for the purpose of—
voluntary transactions. Part I then argues that property also protects
reliance that evolves naturally over time. From this perspective,
property law is best understood as moderating the pace at which
reliance interests change. That is what property does. Part II surveys
some of the many doctrines that function in precisely this way. Part III
then applies this dynamic view of reliance to contested areas of property
36. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351, 365
(1997) (characterizing the political disputes over property rights).
37. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); cf.
PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHOUN, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 3 (Cosimo 2007) (1840) (“Property is theft!”).
38. See, e.g., Todd F. Gaziano, PLF’s Commitment to End the Unconstitutional Regulatory
State, SWORD & SCALES, Spring 2018, at 3 (“[Pacific Legal Foundation] is the leader in thought
and action to end the regulatory state and restore government to its proper, constitutional limits.”).
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law, bringing surprising coherence to doctrines in nuisance law, adverse
possession, and the Takings Clause.
I. RELIANCE IN PROPERTY
Property law includes a heterogenous collection of topics and
doctrines. It can be difficult to identify a single theme that links
together rules as diverse as the touch-and-concern requirement for
covenants, the rule against perpetuities, and the law of nuisance. It is
therefore no surprise that normative accounts of property are deeply
contested. Philosophers and legal scholars have wrestled with them for
centuries. 39 Instead of asking what property is, reframing the inquiry
to ask what it does—i.e., what role it serves in our legal system—reveals
a theme that cuts through all these accounts: the institution of property
protects people’s reliance on resources in the world. 40 But the source
and content of that reliance is surprisingly undertheorized.
A. Defining Reliance
Reliance is ubiquitous in the law. In criminal law, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder sounds in
reliance; it reflects the intuition that people should be able to rely on
existing rules when choosing how to act. 41 Prohibitions on retroactivity
outside the criminal law are also explained by reliance. 42 Reliance is
39. Leading works discussing the origins and content of property include, generally, among
many others, ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1113 (Richard
McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (c. 330 B.C.E.); G. W. F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1821); THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1647); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
(Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1739–40); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1689); and KARL MARX,
CAPITAL (Ernest Unterman, Samuel Moor & Edward Aveling trans., Stief Books 2018) (1867).
40. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1369, 1376 (2013) (observing that the predictability offered by property regimes “allows actors
to invest in reliance on clear rules of the game, avoids unfair surprise, controls the arbitrary
discretion of judges, and promotes equality before the law by treating cases alike”).
41. See Serkin, supra note 35, at 1230 (“[I]t seems unfair for a government to change the
regulatory rules in the middle of the game, thereby interfering with owners’ reasonable reliance
on preexisting rules.”); see also, e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 876
(1960) (“Hostility of the Framers toward bills of attainder was so great that they took the unusual
step of barring such legislative punishments by the States as well as the Federal Government.”).
Reliance on apparent authority can sometimes be a defense to a criminal prosecution. Thomas W.
White, Reliance on Apparent Authority as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
775 (1977).
42. See Serkin, supra note 35, at 1230 (describing how government is not allowed to change
the rules of the game on which private citizens have relied). Daniel Troy, in his leading treatment
of the retroactivity problem, framed the issue this way: “[T]o what extent is one willing ‘to sacrifice

(Do Not Delete)

2022]

4/18/2022 4:42 PM

WHAT PROPERTY DOES

901

invoked so frequently in so many different contexts that it appears as
an undercurrent throughout all law. 43
Reliance in this broad sense does not require a technical or
legalistic definition. It is a familiar and colloquial concept. In the
context of property, it refers quite simply to someone’s behavior
resulting from a belief about an entitlement to a resource in the future,
like planting a field to harvest the crops. 44 Such reliance can take the
form of an affirmative action but also, for example, a decision not to sell
a house, or to forego cutting down trees, because of an expectation that
the house or the trees will still be available at some later time.
Importantly, reliance is informed by law but is not determined
by positive legal rights. 45 Reliance is also affected by community norms,
by politics, and by all of the routine day-to-day interactions that occur
without any reference to the legal system at all—like the scenic view
across a neighbor’s property, or the rules governing parking spaces after
a snowstorm in South Boston. 46 People can and often do rely on things
to which they have no legal entitlement, i.e., no contract, no property
right, or no statutory right of any kind. Reliance in this sense is
therefore a psychological phenomenon more than a legal one. 47
reliance on existing rules’ to accommodate ‘the need for change?’ ” DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE
LEGISLATION 3 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 746, (1984) (“The protection of reasonable
reliance interests is not only a legitimate governmental objective: it provides ‘an exceedingly
persuasive justification . . . .’ ” (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981))).
44. This is distinct from the reliance interest animating Singer’s article, which is primarily
reliance on relationships and not on resources. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 13, at 664 (“The legal
rules often grant the non-owner immunity from having such access revoked when the non-owner
has legitimately relied on a relationship with the owner that made such access possible.”).
45. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 50–55 (discussing how people develop expectations with
regards to property through norms and “narrative”); Singer, supra note 13, at 666–67 n.178
(“Expectations are to some extent (but not completely) dependent on what the legal rules are . . . .
[E]xpectations may develop that are legitimate and worthy of legal protection even in the absence
of prior specific legal rules giving parties a right to expect certain things.”). But cf. Glen O.
Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
546, 564 (1991) (“The only basis for determining what people expect [of property] is what they have
been told to expect based on their legal rights.”).
46. See, e.g., Maureen Dahill, The Unofficial Rules for Saving a Spot, CAUGHTINSOUTHIE
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://caughtinsouthie.com/features/unofficial-rules-2/ [https://perma.cc/DQ7DRMZ9]; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 18–21 (1990) (discussing role of norms in
collective management of resources).
47. There is a venerable tradition of scholarship focused on this kind of “human nature”
account of law. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1047, 1047 (2011) (“Carol [Rose] points out that famous accounts of property from Locke
and Blackstone to Demsetz all involve a view—or views—of human nature.”). Ultimately, Justice
Holmes’s admonishment is apt: “The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts
of man.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). For a
similar focus on important psychological intuitions, see Davidson, supra note 20, at 444, noting
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This use of reliance is very different from the more technical one
that pervades contract law, for example. 48 In most contract law and
scholarship, reliance is both the basis for—and a measure of—
damages. 49 As one theorist explained, the reliance interest is one’s
“interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract not been made.” 50
More generally, of course, contracts are a mechanism for
inducing reliance over time. 51 As a practical matter, in transactions of
any complexity, reliance is the entire point. 52 The reason for contracting
is to create or induce reliance, and reliance arises out of—and from the
moment of—contract formation. 53 Parties have considerable—but not
complete 54—latitude to contract around the possibility of significant
that “[j]ustifications for property rights reflect varying and often implicit assumptions about the
habits of mind that animate the work of property,” and Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61
FLA. L. REV. 285, 325 (2009), writing that “Emphasis on the subjective element of ownership, the
importance of imagination, and psychological attachments, have been key elements in property
theory going back at least to Hume.”
48. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 490
(1996):
Reliance is a form of “relationship-specific investment.” More specifically, it is any
choice, be it action or inaction, which will (1) make S’s performance more valuable to B
if S does in fact perform, but (2) make B worse off than if he had not relied if S fails to
perform. The second element of this definition means that reliance always involves
some risk to the relying party.
49. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2),
46 YALE L. J. 373, 374 (1937) (describing reliance in contract).
50. Robert A. Hudec, Restating the “Reliance Interest,” 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704, 707 (1982)
(describing a theory of reliance in contract).
51. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 13, at 700 (“We enforce promises because they create
expectations that figure into our conduct: We change our behavior based on our trust that promises
will be fulfilled; we act with promises in mind; we rely on them.”). Sometimes, contracts are so
fleeting that their temporal aspect fades into the background. If someone buys something at a
store, the exchange—cash for widgets—is a contract but does not induce reliance in any
meaningful way. Aspects of the transaction may have a temporal dimension, like any warranty
that lasts into the future. But reliance is a relatively unimportant goal or even byproduct of the
transaction.
52. See, e.g., MARTIN HOGG, PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW 98 (2011) (“Reliance theory . . . is
based on the view that promising is moral because a promise generates reliance in others . . . .”).
53. The promise theory of contracts has this kind of reliance explicitly at its core. According
to Martin Hogg, “Promises are only morally (and indeed legally) worthy of being kept on a reliance
approach when such reliance is generated . . . .” Id. at 98–99. Hogg goes on to explain, “Genuine
reliance theorists hold that it is the very presence of the reliance which generates the moral
obligation . . . .” Id. at 99.
54. Under modern contract doctrine, nonbreaching parties may have obligations to mitigate
damages, for example through cover. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N
2020); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[I]f a
buyer of goods who decides, on repudiation by the seller, to ‘ “cover” by making in good faith and
without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in
substitution for those due from the seller,’ he is protected under Uniform Commercial Code § 2712.”). Some changes in the world may be so dramatic as to render the contract unenforceable. See
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changes in the world. 55 And more granular contract terms can specify
all kinds of contingencies that may modify performance obligations. In
the main, the content of these provisions is left to the parties, and
courts’ enforcement is intended to hold parties to their bargains.
In other words, the extent of reliance on contracts is by and large
internal to the substance of the contract and so is subject to negotiation.
Contractual duration, cancellation provisions, mechanisms for
modification of price terms, and so forth are all provisions that can
affect the extent and nature of parties’ reliance. There are limits at the
outer edges. A contract without any reliance at all may be illusory. 56
Some contract doctrines inject a measure of dynamism in contractual
relationships. 57 And efforts to create too much reliance—say, in the
form of excessive liquidated damages—may not be enforced. 58 But
within a large band, the parties themselves can agree on the extent of
reliance embodied in a contract.
The source and content of reliance in property is different but is
surprisingly undertheorized. In most modern accounts of property,
reliance arises primarily through transactions and for the purpose of
facilitating further transactions. Property protects this kind of
“transactional reliance” by promoting strong, stable rights to resources
that endure over time. However, reliance on resources can also arise
Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009)
(allowing impossibility defense if unexpected events upset parties’ expectations). Impossibility can
be a defense to performance, as can impracticability in certain situations. See 102 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 3D 401 Impossibility of Performing Contract § 6, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2021)
(“Under the doctrine of impossibility of performance, one party’s duty to perform under
the contract is discharged when, without any fault of that party, it becomes impossible to
perform.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 261:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without
his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
55. For example, force majeure clauses can excuse performance where acts of God undermine
the purpose of the contract. Michael Polkinghorne & Charles Rosenberg, Expecting the Unexpected:
The Force Majeure Clause, 16 BUS. L. INT’L 49, 50 (2015) (“Force majeure clauses thus serve as a
precaution against the risks posed by certain economic, political and natural disaster events.”).
56. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-12, at
228–38 (3d ed. 1987).
57. Examples include relational contract theory, which focuses on the informal dynamics
governing contract rights, see Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 654
(2010); doctrines related to contract modification, see Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable
Contracts: Another Look at the Law and Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
487 (2006); and output and requirement contracts, see Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in
Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1046 (1992).
58. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 225 (1995) (“It is a basic principle of contract law that contractual provisions
that liquidate damages for breach are not enforceable in the same way as most other kinds of
bargain terms, but instead are reviewed with special scrutiny.”).
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more organically over time. This “evolutionary reliance” is less familiar
but appears throughout the law of property and supplies its own
internal logic. Consider these in turn.
B. Transactional Reliance
The source and purpose of reliance that dominates modern
approaches to property is transactional in nature. People acquire
property through discrete transactions—contracts, gifts, and so forth.
And the law protects property as a way of empowering private control
over resources. This is explicit and obviously true of neoliberal property
theory that privileges free-market exchange over regulations to ensure
that decisionmakers internalize the costs of their actions to the fullest
extent possible. 59 But this transactional view pervades property law
and theory more generally and is lurking at the heart of any
conventional account of property today. 60
For example, a core justification for the institution of private
property is in response to the tragedy of the commons. 61 Communal
ownership of resources can lead to overconsumption. Property is a
response precisely because it solves collective action problems and
facilitates transactions in the resource. 62 Or consider Harold Demsetz’s
anthropologically dubious but famous account of the rise of property
rights in Native American tribes. 63 When animals had only
consumption value, they were not overhunted and there was no need

59. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 12–13 (1985) (arguing against government redistribution and in favor of voluntary
transactions); Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
136 (1979) (“The system I have sketched of property rights . . . provides foundation and
accommodation both of individual rights and of the material prosperity upon which . . . the
happiness of most people depends.”). On cost internalization, see, for example,
Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Harold Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967); and Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003), which states “No one
owner fully internalizes all of the costs associated with [public property], so all users have an
incentive to overuse.”
60. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (justifying property
rules on grounds of facilitating voluntary transactions).
61. See Hardin, supra note 59.
62. Id. at 1245 (arguing that private property prevents overconsumption because it “deters
us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth”).
63. See Demsetz, supra note 59. But see Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish:
Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 121–25 (2005) (arguing
that Demsetz’s theory of private property ignores the role of the political decisionmaking process
in market ordering).
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for private property. 64 People had no reason to try to acquire more pelts
or meat than they could use and consume themselves. But once a
market arose and fur had economic value as an item to trade, incentives
changed. In order to prevent battles over fugitive resources, private
property rights arose over hunting territory. As Demsetz theorized, “the
fur trade made it economic to encourage the husbanding of fur-bearing
animals. Husbanding requires the ability to prevent poaching and this,
in turn, suggests that socioeconomic changes in property in hunting
land will take place.” 65
Property, in this view, is a tool for forcing (or allowing) owners
to internalize the costs of their decisions vis-à-vis resources in the
world. 66 If a farmer plants hemp instead of corn, she reaps the rewards
if hemp succeeds and suffers the costs if corn would have been the better
choice. So too with every property decision: replace the leaky house roof
now or wait a year, build a new garden shed or a hot tub, license the
movie rights to a novel or not. The list is endless. But the through line
is that the goal of property—its animating logic—is to provide rights
that allow people to invest in resources, secure in their ability to realize
the rewards in the future. 67 In colloquial terms, property ensures that
people can reap where they have sown. 68 And this predictability and
control allow people to decide for themselves how to put property to its
highest and best use.
The ubiquity of this framework is partly a testament to the
influence of the Coase Theorem, which asserts that, in the absence of
transaction costs, the initial allocation of resources will not affect their
ultimate distribution because subsequent transactions will transfer
rights and resources into the hands of the parties that value them the
most. 69 It is also a testament to the influence of the law and economics

64. Demsetz, supra note 59, at 351 (“Before the fur trade became established, hunting was
carried on primarily for purposes of food and the relatively few furs that were required for the
hunter’s family.”).
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 348.
67. See LOCKE, supra note 39, at 91–120 (articulating labor theory of property); cf. Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. 175, 180–81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (identifying the functional
goal of property as incentivizing capturing foxes).
68. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 21, at 695; BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 110 (“[Law] says[:]
Labour and I will assure to you the enjoyment of the fruits of your labour—that natural and
sufficient recompense which without me you cannot preserve[;] I will insure it by arresting the hand
which may seek to ravish it from you.”).
69. Coase, supra note 16, at 15 (“[When] market transactions are costless, such a
rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of
production.”).
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movement more generally. 70 Any voluntary transaction, by definition,
involves moving a resource to someone who values it more. 71 And so,
one influential way of assessing a rule or doctrine in property is by its
likely effect on voluntary transactions, or at least its approximation of
the outcome of a voluntary transaction if no such transaction is
possible. 72
Conventional property doctrine and theory therefore focuses on
the ways in which property allocates decisionmaking authority over
resources to owners. 73 This, in turn, motivates an internal logic based
upon stability over time. Ownership ideally begins with original
acquisition of a resource—through doctrines like capture or creation—
and then passes through a series of voluntary transactions that
constitute an unbroken chain of title. 74 Conceptually, the existing
allocation of property can be traced through a chain of voluntary
transactions all the way back to original acquisition, or at least to a time
when “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.” 75 Property
reaches back into the past through a chain of title to justify its current
distribution.
70. At the most general level, Law and Economics is concerned with maximizing welfare. See
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.12, at 95 (8th ed. 2011); Richard A.
Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1987)
(defending wealth maximization as the “best theory, both positive and normative, of common law
rights and remedies”).
71. Economic conditions are “Pareto efficient” where it is impossible to reallocate the
resources in a manner that would make at least one person feel better off without making someone
else worse off. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Concept of “Efficiency” in Economics,
PRINCETON
UNIV.,
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/reinhardt/files/5972016_efficiency_in_economics-conceptual_issues.pdf
(last
visited
Mar.
28,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/9MHR-UAP6].
72. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 547–50 (2005) (detailing the influence of
economic analysis on property law doctrines); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis
of Law, 14–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6960, 1999) (explaining that
consolidated ownership, rights to transfer, and possessory rights are beneficial forms of property
interests because they minimize transaction costs). For the latter, see, for example, CAL. CIV. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS No. 3501 (2020), which defines compensation for purposes of eminent domain as
“the highest price for the property that a willing buyer would have paid in cash to a willing seller.”
73. See Katz, supra note 7, at 278 (“The law preserves the exclusivity of ownership not by
excluding others but by harmonizing their interests in the object with the owner’s position of
agenda-setting authority.”).
74. Cf.
Jack
Gostl,
Lawyer
Joke,
NETFUNNY.COM,
https://www.netfunny.com/rhf/jokes/99/Jan/fhaloan.html
(last
visited
Mar.
28,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/B25V-NAVM] (referring to apocryphal email from a lawyer conducting a title
search as providing title back to God as original owner).
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *76–77; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at
595 (“The chain of title rule is instrumental in maintaining the value of stable ownership by
ensuring that loss of possession—voluntary or involuntary—will not, of itself, endanger the
ownership right. Consequently, the status and benefits of ownership may be enjoyed without
excessive investment in the asset’s protection.”); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1960) (discussing the theory of the lost grant).

(Do Not Delete)

2022]

4/18/2022 4:42 PM

WHAT PROPERTY DOES

907

It also extends forward by protecting expectations about
resources in the world. 76 Property law vindicates people’s reliance on
that chain of title, for example with recordation rules and protection for
bona fide purchasers. 77 The role of property rights in this system is to
ensure that people can rely on resources they acquire, whether through
original acquisition or subsequent transactions. 78 Indeed, Abraham
Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky identified “stability” as property’s
central feature, arguing that “property increases value by creating and
defending stable ownership.” 79 Rights must be clear and stable at any
moment in time.
Transactional reliance therefore appears instantly. If you buy
my house, you can rely on owning that house from the moment we sign
the closing documents. My reliance in the house is wiped clean, or
nearly so. I may return days or years later and may even knock on your
door and ask to look around, but we both understand that you are under
no obligation to let me in, and that my ability to rely on the house
terminated the moment I sold it to you—the same moment at which
your reliance began. 80
The resulting property rights are also presumptively perpetual,
generating open-ended reliance. 81 While some specific forms of
76. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 586
(1988) (“The raison d’etre of such [titling] systems is to clarify and perfectly specify landed property
rights for the sake of easy and smooth transfers of land.”); see also A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 119 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (“An important aspect of the
owner's position is that he should be able to look forward to remaining owner indefinitely if he so
chooses.”).
77. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Dealing with Dirty Deeds: Matching Nemo Dat Preferences
with Property Law Pragmatism, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (describing protection of bona fide
purchasers); cf. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81 (1985)
(“[C]lear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict.”).
78. Even where there are breaks in that chain, as when property is lost, narrow doctrines
step in to settle title, in effect reaffirming the overall sanctity of stable property rights. See, e.g.,
supra Part II.A (discussing adverse possession).
79. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 552 (“[T]he benefits provided by property systems
increase with the stability of the property rights they create.”); see also Lovett, supra note 14, at
466 (describing role of property in promoting stability).
80. See J. E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 752
(1996) (“[W]e feel no obligation to consider the wishes of the seller when we decide how to use the
things we buy. The seller has relinquished his interest in the property by trading it.”). But see
Modern Family: The One That Got Away (ABC television broadcast May 25, 2011) (following
siblings who break into former house to recreate a photograph from their childhood). Even here,
there is space between reliance and what the law actually protects. Conveyance of property
through a defective deed, for example, can induce transactional reliance, even if it does not
successfully convey legal title. See, e.g., White v. Farabee, 713 S.E.2d 4, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)
(“[B]ecause the deeds were executed by a group of persons failing to have full and complete title to
the property, the deeds fail to actually convey the land as described in the deeds.”).
81. But see Harding, supra note 47, at 286 (“[P]roperty interests typically exist for a specific
time period.”). See generally BENTHAM, supra note 24.
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ownership like the life estate or term of years come with time limits,
most property rights are temporally unbounded. Fee simple ownership
is defined by its infinite length. 82 Property’s persistence over time
means that reliance interests, once they arise, cast shadows far into the
future. Contracts expire, either explicitly or implicitly. 83 Property does
not.
Richard Epstein has argued that this unlimited duration is an
important feature of property rights, at least those acquired by some
claim to first-in-time (or through chain of title back to first-in-time). 84
In one of the more explicit and lucid accounts of property’s temporality,
Epstein reasoned that only perpetual ownership avoids the problems
that would otherwise arise at the end of the tenure, for example rentseeking or other strategic behavior that can destroy the value of a
resource or impose other costs. 85 In his view, temporally bounded
ownership creates a mismatch between reaping and sowing and would
make an owner reluctant to invest. Perpetual property rights prevent
the kinds of strategic behavior that otherwise might occur as ownership
ends.
This need for enduring stability also prioritizes rights of
exclusion. For people to be able to rely on resources over time, they
must—by and large 86—be able to exclude others. Indeed, Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith place exclusion at the heart of property
because it creates and enforces clear boundaries, allowing people to set
for themselves the terms on which they will transact. 87 They follow on

82. D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3, 9 (2009) (“Because the fee simple absolute is of unlimited duration, it is not
accompanied by a future interest.”); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1955, 1961 (2012) (“Property intentionally bundles along the temporal dimension and, at least in
the case of the fee simple absolute, it does so in a very open-ended way.”).
83. See, e.g., 91 N.Y. JUR. 2D Real Property Sales and Exchanges § 95, Westlaw (database
updated Nov. 2021) (“Generally, when nothing appears in the writings as to the time and manner
of taking the property, the omission is not necessarily fatal since the law will presume a
reasonable time and customary procedure.”).
84. Epstein, supra note 21, at 694 (“Ownership acquired by first possession is and should be
of infinite duration.”).
85. Id. at 695–96; see also Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the
Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 273, 283 (1998) (arguing that
changes in property rights create the possibility of pricing errors that lead to inefficiency).
86. Larissa Katz has argued that exclusion is not always strictly necessary, and that others
may be able to use resources so long as their use does not interfere with owners’ “agenda-setting
authority” over the resource. See Katz, supra note 7 (arguing that exclusion does not necessarily
require a right to exclude others’ non-interfering uses of a resource).
87. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702 (2012)
(“The exclusion strategy defines a chunk of the world—a thing—under the owner’s control . . . .”).
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a long tradition. 88 Lee Fennell makes explicit this connection between
stability and exclusion. In her article “Lumpy Property,” she argues
that property creates and then enforces usable “lumps.” 89 As she points
out, “A bridge stretching only three-quarters of the distance across a
chasm is useless, while a bridge that is longer than necessary does no
more good than one that just spans the gap.” 90 And she argues that
Merrill and Smith’s theory “takes as a given the blocky chunks of
control that property has historically given owners. Interfering with
what seems to be a minor twig, we are warned, could upend the owner’s
plans and projects in ways we cannot foresee.” 91 Exclusion and stability
are flip sides of the same coin—and that coin is protecting owners’
reliance on resources in the world.
Doctrines preventing involuntary incursions are therefore
central to protecting and encouraging voluntary transactions. Merrill
and Smith begin their property casebook with a trespass case, Jacque
v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. 92 There, Defendant sought to deliver a mobile
home by crossing Plaintiffs’ snow-covered field without their consent.
The trespass was clear, but so was the absence of harm. A jury awarded
only $1 in compensatory damages, but $100,000 in punitive damages.
Upholding the award, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, “[B]oth
the private landowner and society have much more than a nominal
interest in excluding others from private land. . . . [N]ominal damages
may support a punitive damage award in an action for intentional
trespass to land.” 93 Trespass is thus the clearest and most familiar
doctrine protecting owners’ reliance on resources by strictly policing the
right to exclude.
Property law also reinforces stability and the centrality of
voluntary transactions by enforcing rights through injunctions instead
of damages in most property contexts—the distinction between
“property rules” and “liability rules.” 94 The latter are damages assessed
by a court. The former are stronger, providing “immunity against forced
transactions.” 95 Property rules protect owners’ right to choose the terms
88. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *2 (defining property as “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”).
89. See Fennell, supra note 82, at 1964.
90. Id. at 1956.
91. Id. at 1982.
92. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
93. Id. at 161.
94. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 60 (distinguishing between property and liability
rules).
95. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1823, 1824 (2009); see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 60, at 1092 (“An entitlement is
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on which they transact, and Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
justify them when transaction costs and market failures are likely to be
low. 96 Damages, after all, amount to a kind of pricing mechanism for
the invasion of rights. This is obviously true in contracts, which is
suffused with theories of efficient breach. 97 Property is stronger. It has
a kind of moral force. 98 There is no equivalent sense of efficient breach
in property, and violations of property rights are often remedied with
injunctive relief and punitive damages. 99
Ultimately, property rights arise to encourage the development
of valuable resources, and then are defined and protected to promote
stability and minimize transaction costs. Strong and durable property
rights protect owners’ autonomy in deciding whether or not to transact,
giving parties themselves the ability to decide whether, how, and when
a resource should be used, developed, transferred, or even left unused.
This transactional approach views the institution of property as
functioning primarily to protect owners’ stable reliance on resources in
the world. The principal sources of property rights are voluntary
exchanges traced all the way back to some original acquisition, and the
purpose of property law is to protect that chain of title and to minimize
transaction costs.
C. Evolutionary Reliance
While transactional reliance permeates property today, reliance
on resources can also arise through a more organic process of evolution
over time, what this Article labels “evolutionary reliance.” 100 Property’s
protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from
its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller.”).
96. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 60, at 1092–93 (defining a property rule as “the
form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention . . . . It lets each of
the parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the buyer
does not offer enough”).
97. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977) (“The modern law of contract damages is based on the premise
that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to perform, but rather an obligation
to choose between performance and compensatory damages.”).
98. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849,
1891 (2007). Alternatively, some might say it is suffused with violence. See Daniel J. Sharfstein,
Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood in Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 635 (2012) (exploring the role of
violence in the acquisition and use of property); Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The
Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59 (2014) (describing the violent nature
of historical private ordering regimes).
99. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Wis. 1997).
100. In fact, it may take more forms than this, but a thoroughgoing typology of reliance
interests in the legal system is beyond the scope of this Article.
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core function may be to protect reliance on resources in the world, but
whose reliance it protects can shift, as can the substantive content of
the rights it reflects. As a result, property law mediates between
people’s competing reliance interests, allowing them to evolve. This is
in sharp contrast to the purely transactional view of property’s origins
and purpose.
Evolutionary reliance is less familiar as a category but captures
a universal phenomenon. It is the reliance on resources that arises
simply through repetition or familiarity over time. It should take only
a moment to think of something on which you have come to rely despite
the lack of any legal right to it, perhaps a shortcut over private property
to school or work that you take every morning, a scenic vista from your
living room, a favorite field, or any number of nearly limitless
examples. 101 You can also rely on a particular use of your property
whether or not it is strictly legal, like renting an apartment in violation
of local zoning, rehearsing emo music in your garage in violation of
nuisance law, and so forth. Evolutionary reliance, in short, arises
alongside but separately from law. 102
When property law protects evolutionary as opposed to
transactional reliance, it is not protecting stable rights of exclusion. It
is instead serving as the locus for competing reliance interests that
change over time. This is fundamentally a dynamic vision of property
quite different from the neoliberal conception of property as the hardedged building blocks of consensual transactions.
Dynamism in this context is not the same as weakness. Property
rights can be both strong and dynamic. Indeed, they are. They are
strong at any given time, but dynamic over time. This runs counter to
most people’s intuitions. Laura Underkuffler, for example, has argued
that property is inherently incompatible with change. As she puts it, in
criticizing the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence: “The core
difficulty . . . is the collision of the idea of property with the idea of

101. People can, indeed, rely on the availability of a footpath, and emotions can run very high
in the face of interference. See, e.g., Julie Halpert, Sue Thy Neighbor, ANN ARBOR OBSERVER (May
2014),
https://annarborobserver.com/articles/sue_thy_neighbor.html#.XfgEqy2ZNp9
[https://perma.cc/7AB6-X8BZ] (describing one such costly legal battle).
102. Law sometimes trails reliance and sometimes leads it. Someone might rely on something
for a long time before the law eventually catches up and recognizes a right (if it ever does). Or the
law might grant a right—say, a rent-regulated apartment or a patent—and thereby induce
reliance in the future. See Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913 (2016) (discussing regulatory property); Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private
Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REGUL. 125 (2013) (discussing
property rights in taxi medallions). The focus here is on the former and how people come to rely
on resources in the world, and how the law then comes to vindicate reliance.
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change.” 103 The account here, in contrast, sees dynamism at the heart
of property itself. Change is not a concession to other important values
but is instead inherent in property itself. 104 What property law does is
moderate the pace of change.
Reliance can solidify, as people rely consistently on a set of
expectations around the ongoing availability of a resource. And it can
liquify, as expectations shift through nonuse. 105 When changes occur
slowly, reliance may evolve without much awareness at all. But sudden
changes can be enormously disruptive to settled expectations. If a
parent grabs a toy from a child’s hand, the child will likely cry. But if
the parent gives a warning—“five more minutes before you have to put
that away”—the eventual transition can be smoother because the
child’s reliance on the toy is given a chance to shift more gradually. This
is no guarantee of the absence of tears, but anyone with children
understands that advance warning can have dramatic effects on a
child’s experience of the eventual wrench of loss precisely because it
eases the transition over time.
Evolutionary reliance is related to, but distinct from, the
endowment effect that is well known in the psychological literature. 106
The endowment effect—a function of loss aversion—explains that
people tend to value resources in their possession more highly than
resources they do not yet own. 107 The resulting ask/offer gap is a staple
of behavioral economics. 108 Importantly, some studies support the
intuition that the value of an object grows over time the longer the
object is possessed. 109 But these studies have not focused on the pace of
103. Underkuffler, supra note 13, at 2016; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 573
(“The stability in ownership afforded by the law creates the possibility for developing new kinds of
value in, and uses of, property that would otherwise be unavailable.”).
104. Nestor Davidson, too, has argued that people rely on the legal system to be responsive to
changes in the world, and so he too sees dynamism in the content of property law. Davidson, supra
note 20.
105. Margaret Jane Radin, Property as Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977 (1982) (“[P]eople
and things have ongoing relationships which have their own ebb and flow . . . .”).
106. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990) (citing
studies).
107. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483–84 (1998) (describing endowment effect). This
insight long predates behavioral economics. See BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 115 (“Every part of
my property may have, in my estimation, besides its intrinsic value, a value of affection . . . .”).
108. See Jolls et al., supra note 107, at 1484 (“This effect is generally referred to as the
‘endowment effect’; it is a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of ‘loss aversion’ . . . which in
turn is a central building block of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory.”); Owen D. Jones &
Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008) (discussing the endowment effect in the context of evolutionary biology).
109. See, e.g., Michael A. Strahilevitz & George Loewenstein, The Effect of Ownership History
on the Valuation of Objects, 25 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 276 (1998) (discussing studies that suggest
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change. As a result, existing psychological literature gestures at, but
does not fully capture, the intuition here: that people come to rely on
resources in ways that change predictably over time.
Property law and property regimes are of course much more
complex institutions than a child’s simple claims of possession or the
value that research subjects assign to coffee mugs. 110 Nevertheless, the
same basic intuition applies. From municipal street mapping to
amortization of prior nonconforming uses in land use law, advance
warning of change can have meaningful legal consequences. Or, as
Carol Rose elegantly articulated the intuition in a different context,
“The nooks and crannies of comfortable doctrine supplement the sheer
passage of time, reinforcing people’s tendency to settle in and think that
their ‘rights’ must have always been there.” 111
That property serves precisely this role is evident across a
surprisingly wide swath of doctrines and reveals a very different
internal logic than the conventional transactional view.
II. EVOLUTIONARY RELIANCE IN PROPERTY DOCTRINES
Many property rights arise and change through the gradual
evolution of reliance. Instead of creating static rights, or fixed sticks in
a bundle of rights, property is better characterized as the nexus of a web
of competing reliance interests. Property doctrines mediating these
kinds of interests reveal that some property rights are shaped simply
by habit and expectations based on familiarity over time. 112 The
evolutionary nature of reliance therefore results in dynamism in
property rights. This Part samples core property doctrines protecting
evolutionary reliance. The key observation is that all of the familiar
doctrines discussed below balance reliance interests that shift
gradually over time.

“object valuation is affected by both past and present ownership status—that is, by the history of
ownership”); Suzanne B. Shu & Joann Peck, Psychological Ownership and Affective Reaction:
Emotional Attachment Process Variables and the Endowment Effect, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 439
(2011) (“Our research supports the concept of emotional attachment as an explanation for many of
the endowment effect findings . . . .”).
110. Krier & Serkin, supra note 1, at 149 (identifying possession as a heuristic for the more
complex institution of property).
111. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 611
(1998).
112. Cf. BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 149–50 (identifying “habit” as a basis for the
establishment of “natural expectations” to resources that are antecedent to law or legislation).
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A. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession reveals precisely these forces at work. 113
Through ongoing use of property for the statutory period, a nonowner
can eventually claim title to property by adverse possession so long as
the “rightful” owner does not assert his rights before the statute has
run. 114
Underlying justifications for adverse possession are familiar but
surprisingly contested. Some courts and commentators focus on an
earning theory, awarding ownership to an adverse possessor as a kind
of reward for putting property to productive use. 115 Others focus on a
sleeping theory, which charges the true owner with demerits for failing
to protect the property. 116 Still others invoke transaction cost
rationales, 117 evidentiary hurdles, 118 or the integrity of the titling

113. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 13, at 665–69 (discussing adverse possession); Hamill, supra
note 19, at 230–31 (examining the temporality of property through the lens of adverse possession).
114. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 9, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2022).
Precisely the same analysis applies to the constellation of property doctrines related to adverse
possession. Easements by prescription arise through the continued use of property over time so
long as the true owner does not take steps to stop the use. The more byzantine fee simple subject
to condition subsequent (“FSSCS”) contains the same dynamic. As its name implies, the FSSCS
contains a condition that, if triggered, entitles a third party to take title to the property through a
right of entry. Unlike a fee simple determinable, where the third party takes title automatically,
the holder of a right of entry must exercise that right, and must do so within a pre-specified amount
of time. That time limit is not necessarily the same as the time limit for adverse possession.
Nevertheless, the animating intuition is the same. If the right of entry goes unexercised for long
enough, the FSSCS converts into a fee simple absolute and the future interest is extinguished. See
1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 205, Westlaw PATTONTITL (database updated Dec.
2021).
115. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569 (1823) (“The measure of property
acquired by occupancy is determined, according to the law of nature, by the extent of men’s wants,
and their capacity of using it to supply them.”); Radin, supra note 21, at 750 (“[I]f property is
acquired from the common by a nonowner simply by taking it and using it, can we not sympathize
with someone who does likewise with owned but unused property, especially if she does not know
it is owned?”); CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 15 (1994) (discussing adverse possession).
116. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1122, 1130 (1984).
117. Rose, supra note 77, at 81 (“[C]lear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting
conflict.”); see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419,
2441–42 (2001) (“It is hard to be confident today the net effect of adverse possession is to increase
a purchaser’s certainty that his seller is the legal owner.”).
118. Merrill, supra note 116, at 1128 (“As time passes, witnesses die, memories fade, and
evidence gets lost or destroyed.”).
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system, 119 to name just a few. But leading accounts implicitly recognize
that evolutionary reliance plays a central role. 120
As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in his justification for
the doctrine of adverse possession: “A thing which you have enjoyed and
used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes
root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the
act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.” 121
The quote is familiar and much studied, but revisiting it in this
context highlights important themes of evolutionary reliance: that
property rights can arise through ongoing reliance by a nonowner and
that the underlying reliance emerges with the passage of time. 122
Others—nonowners—may come to rely upon a resource in ways that
the law eventually protects. Thomas Merrill also discussed the doctrine
in precisely these terms, writing: “[An] explanation for the system of
adverse possession focuses on the possessor, and in particular on the
reliance interests that the possessor may have developed through
longstanding possession of the property.” 123
Here we have the vision of property as the locus of evolving
interests laid bare. As Holmes and later Merrill both observed, it is the
passage of time that generates the nonowner’s reliance. 124 The person
119. Rose, supra note 77, at 80 (“The possibility of transferring titles through adverse
possession once again serves to ensure that members of the public can rely upon their own
reasonable perceptions . . . .”).
120. See Singer, supra note 13, at 665–69 (“As time goes on, the adverse possessor’s reliance
interests are likely to become increasingly substantial.”); Hamill, supra note 19, at 231 (same).
121. Holmes, supra note 47, at 477. In a letter to William James, Holmes expanded on this
vision of adverse possession, writing: “[M]an, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his
roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can’t be displaced
without cutting at his life.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to William James (Apr. 1,
1907), in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 417–18 (Max Lerner ed., reprt. 1946) (1943).
122. See Harding, supra note 47, at 292 n.36 (“While adverse possession has many elements,
the most unwavering is the simple passage of time.”); see also BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 159
(“Possession, after a certain period fixed by the law ought to prevail over all other titles.”).
123. Merrill, supra note 116, at 1131. He identified as the competing reliance interests: (1) the
adverse possessor’s reliance on the property that develops over time; (2) the true owner’s reliance
on the underlying resource and the stability of property rights; and (3) third parties’ reliance—
vendors, creditors, tenants, and so forth—who rely on the fact of possession as a “rough and ready
substitute for an expensive and time-consuming title search.” Id. Another thoroughgoing
utilitarian account focuses on competing monitoring, uncertainty, and demoralization costs, all of
which vary with the length of the statutory period. See Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession
and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q.
723, 727–30 (1986) (discussing the uncertainty, monitoring, and demoralization costs associated
with the landowner’s “risk of permanently losing out to squatters”).
124. Holmes, supra note 47, at 477. For a similar account through a different methodological
lens, see POSNER, supra note 70, § 3.12, at 97–98:
Over time, a person becomes attached to property that he regards as his own . . . and
the deprivation of the property would be wrenching. Over the same period of time, as
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who tills a field, erects a fence, occupies a house, or otherwise treats
property as her own will eventually develop expectations that solidify
gradually, over time. Imagine someone starts tilling a field and is
immediately told the field belongs to someone else. That may elicit
disappointment, but the wrench of loss will be much different after the
adverse possessor has tilled the field without interruption for five, ten,
or even fifteen years. 125 At a certain point, the adverse possessor’s
expectations about ongoing use of the property harden. This is not
exactly the same as the earning theory in the property literature,
because it is not—or at least should not be seen as—a reward for the
productive use of the property. Instead, the productive use of property
is evidence of the adverse possessor’s reliance on the property. In other
words, the earning theory views the purpose of adverse possession as
inducing the productive use of property. 126 In contrast, the account
offered here views productive use as evidence of evolutionary reliance.
This is a better description of the doctrine. Courts and
commentators have long wrestled with defining the productive uses
that the law should reward. 127 That is a fraught endeavor and can lead
to perverse results. In the famously wrongheaded case of Van
Valkenburgh v. Lutz, for example, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected an adverse possession claim based—it seems—on classist
disapproval of the nature of the adverse possessor’s use of the
property. 128 Focusing on evolutionary reliance avoids these kinds of
judgments and turns instead on the extent to which the adverse
possessor’s use indicates that he or she has come to rely on the property.
Simultaneously, the true owner’s own reliance diminishes over
time with disuse or neglect. Failing to protect property from ongoing
adverse possession is some evidence of the erosion of the owner’s
reliance on the property. In general, property law will of course protect
Holmes pointed out, a person loses attachment to property that he regards as no longer
his own, and the restoration of the property would give him, therefore, only moderate
pleasure.
125. One of the earliest common law writs, the assize of novel disseisin, reflects this same
view, providing a relatively streamlined process for retaking possession of property from an
intruder or someone claiming competing ownership, but only if the intrusion or claim were recent.
See DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN 37 (1973) (“An action . . . could be
justified and made acceptable . . . only for claims that were founded on the allegation that the
defendant had disseised the plaintiff at some recent date.”); G.O. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 339 (1948) (“The assize of novel disseisin . . . allowed any freeholder,
who had been recently dispossessed of his land, to obtain a writ from the king which would put the
matter before a sworn inquest of his neighbours.”).
126. See ROSE, supra note 115, at 15.
127. Id. (discussing why payment of taxes is required for adverse possession).
128. 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952) (rejecting an adverse possession claim for use that resembled
storing junk on the land).
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a property owner’s right to her property whether or not she actively uses
it. 129 People can indeed rely on property with which they seldom
interact. 130 But if enough time passes, the reliance becomes increasingly
abstract. This subtly reframes the traditional “sleeping theory” of
adverse possession, which views passive nonuse of property by the true
owner as a kind of demerit—as if active ongoing use is superior,
whether economically or morally. 131 That is normatively controversial,
and commentators have indeed puzzled over the sleeping theory for this
reason. 132 But reliance offers a different account. The point is not that
the owner has behaved inappropriately or that active use is normatively
superior to passive use. 133 It is, instead, that too little care or regard for
land, reflected in a failure even to stop someone else’s active use for a
long period of time, is good evidence that the true owner no longer relies
on the property.
Ultimately, then, the doctrine of adverse possession should be
seen as resolving this conflict between competing reliance claims. The
true owner’s reliance diminishes over time through disuse, just as the
adverse possessor’s reliance increases. 134 Given long enough, the
interests of the adverse possessor eventually will eclipse the true
owner’s reliance on the property.

129. Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1455 (2013) (“It is, strictly speaking, true to say . . . that the law of
tangible property permits owners to choose not to use their property.”).
130. See id. (“The law does not hesitate to penalize owners for nonuse where that nonuse
harms third parties and, in particular, where it harms the interest that those parties have in use
and possession of their own property.”).
131. Cf. Merrill, supra note 116, at 1130–31 (footnotes omitted):
The passive (and presumably absentee) owner will be harder to negotiate with, if only
because he will be harder to locate. When the [true owner] is required to assert his right
to exclude, therefore, he is in effect being asked to “flush out” offers to purchase his
property, to make a market in the land. On this view, then, the sleeping-owner rationale
is . . . a justification based on the desirability of encouraging market transactions in
property rights.
132. See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 816, 857 (1994):
[A]dverse possession law as applied to wild lands may be reconceptualized as a variant
of the capture rule. Privately owned, undeveloped lands are analogous to a captured
resource such as a caged deer. The owner who exploits her property protects her title.
But the owner who retains his land in its natural condition has effectively allowed it to
elude his grasp.
133. But see ROSE, supra note 115, at 15 (arguing that the “lazy” owner consistently loses).
134. Third parties’ reliance interests might also deserve protection in this context. See, e.g.,
Yourik v. Mallonee, 921 A.2d 869, 873 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (“[T]here is a need to protect
the reliance interests of either the adverse possessor or others dealing with the adverse possessor
that are justifiably based on the status quo.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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B. Accretion and Avulsion
An esoteric doctrine made momentarily famous by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection 135 governs the shifting of
littoral and riparian property boundaries. It also provides one of the
clearest examples of the ways in which property law incorporates a
dynamic vision of reliance that depends upon the pace of change.
While most people tend to think of land and its boundaries as
fixed, that is not necessarily true where a boundary is defined by
water. 136 Rivers and oceans can shift over time through the gradual
processes of erosion and accretion. Erosion, of course, involves the slow
eating away of land over time, and accretion the opposite. 137 When it
comes to a river or stream separating two parcels, these shifts can be
zero-sum, adding land to one side while reducing land on the other. And
the rule, in general, is that these kinds of slow natural changes will in
fact shift the boundary line. 138 In other words, the legal boundary
remains with the river wherever it flows and is not fixed in some precise
location.
The exception is avulsion. Where the change to the path of a
river or a shoreline happens dramatically, it does not alter the property
lines, and property owners are free to restore their property to the
boundaries as they existed before the avulsive event. 139 If, for example,
a dam breaks or there is significant flooding from a hurricane that
alters the course of a river or a shoreline, the legal property lines do not
change even if the location and path of the river does. 140
135. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
136. Id. at 707–08.
137. See Nicholas Blomley, Simplification Is Complicated: Property, Nature, and the Rivers of
Law, 40 ENV’T & PLAN. A 1825, 1829 (2008) (describing but problematizing the distinction between
accretion and avulsion).
138. See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed,
23 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 305, 306 (2009) (“The law provides that when the water’s edge shifts ‘gradually
and imperceptibly’ (accretion), the property boundary moves with it.”); see also Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 709 (describing law regarding avulsion and accretion in Florida
statutory and common law).
139. See Sax, supra note 138, at 306 (“[W]here the shift is ‘sudden or violent’ (avulsion), the
boundary stays where it was.”); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S., at 709 (“In
Florida, as at common law, the littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his
property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has become dry land by avulsion
continues to belong to the owner of the seabed . . . .”); Blomley, supra note 137, at 1829 (“What
happens if you lose land through erosion? If the land erodes slowly and imperceptibly, there is no
legal remedy. However, if such a change happens suddenly through a shift in the river channel,
through ‘avulsion’, you retain ownership of the land.”).
140. See, e.g., Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of
Riparian and Littoral Title Problems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 265, 281 (1991) (footnotes
omitted):
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This distinction between erosion and accretion on the one hand,
and avulsion on the other, means that slow gradual changes are
incorporated into property rights without undermining owners’ reliance
on their resources. 141 But unexpected, dramatic changes are not. 142 This
is true even if the ultimate effects of accretion and avulsion are the
same. A river might change location by fifty feet either slowly over
years, or suddenly after a flood. While the impact is the same, the pace
of change determines whether the law will incorporate or resist the
change.
In a thoroughgoing treatment of the topic, Joseph Sax explored
the origins of the distinction between accretion and avulsion in the early
common law and even back to Roman law. 143 He demonstrated that
courts have long struggled to distinguish between the two. The longstanding principle is that accretive changes must be “imperceptible.” 144
But how fast is too fast? Sax reports on an 1884 case, Attorney-General
v. Reeve, in which an English court had to distinguish between accretion
and avulsion. Faced with an argument that accretive change must be
imperceptible to an observer, Lord Coleridge asked, “But how long is he
to watch? As long as Demosthenes might have taken in reciting his
oration De Corona? Would the accretion be perceptible if an addition
could be perceived at the end of the oration, or how long?” 145 Current
case law suggests that the difference between erosion and accretion
might depend upon the nature of the river. The Mississippi and
Missouri Rivers, for example, are “both noted for their tumultuous
behavior[s]” and avulsion must be more dramatic than the changes that
ordinarily occur. 146

“Avulsion” is defined as the process whereby the action of water causes a sudden,
perceptible loss of or addition to land. Examples of avulsive action are: (1) A river
breaking through the narrow neck of an ox bow, bypassing the former ox-bowed
channel; and (2) sudden deposits due to floods or storms, or the creation of a natural
lake when a mud slide dams a stream.
141. See id. (describing avulsion); Blomley, supra note 137, at 1829 (same).
142. See Lear, supra note 140, at 281 (“The common law rule is that avulsive changes do not
affect the boundaries of riparian and littoral lands.”).
143. See Sax, supra note 138, at 306.
144. See id. at 308 (citing Blackstone).
145. Id. at 338.
146. See id. at 343–44 (discussing related case law). In discussing the notion of adverse
possession and the significance of the passage of time, Jeremy Bentham wrote:
But what length of time is necessary to produce this displacement of expectation? or
[sic], in other words, what period is necessary to legitimate property in the hands of a
possessor, and to extinguish every opposite title? To this inquiry, no exact answer can
be given. It is necessary to draw at hazard the line of demarcation, according to the kind
and value of the property in question.
BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 160.
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For Sax, Reeve revealed the incoherence of the inquiry. As he
framed the question, “Why should it matter whether the water’s edge
shifts as the result of a storm and the sudden deposit of alluvion, rather
than from gradual accretion?” 147 He identified several possible
justifications for the rule but found them all wanting. For example, he
explored the “lost boundary” rationale: “[T]hat when there is a sudden
change, the former bounds are easy to determine, and the issue arises
immediately, rather than after many years of very slowly changing
water lines.” 148 But subsequent courts either repudiated or implicitly
abandoned that reasoning. 149 Sax ultimately argued that courts should
ignore the speed or extent of the change, and should focus instead on
core values, like the importance of access to the water. 150
Evolutionary reliance, however, suggests an alternative
justification, and one that Sax even hinted at in passing. He analyzed a
famous old common law treatise that noted, “of petty and unperceivable
increasements from the sea the King gains no property, for de minimis
non curat Rex.” 151 In other words, the King does not care about gradual,
imperceptible changes that happen slowly over time. Or, as Sax pithily
summarized the treatise’s claim, “The gradualness of the process also
diminishes the sense of loss by the loser.” 152 That claim does not
reappear in Sax’s argument, but it makes sense of the otherwise
confused case law and provides its own normative justification for the
difference between accretion and avulsion. Ultimately, littoral or
riparian property owners should expect that their property boundaries
will change over time; their expectations—like the common law
King’s—include some measure of dynamism. But where a change
marks a sharp break, they will seek to return to the status quo ante.
Property mediates between these slow shifting interests over time. 153

C. Servitudes
The law of servitudes includes some of the more arcane and
technical doctrines in the mainstream law of property. Concepts like
“touch and concern” and “horizontal privity” are the perennial focus of
147. Sax, supra note 138, at 307.
148. Id. at 316.
149. Id. at 334–43.
150. See id. at 347–53.
151. Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id.
153. This is at least reminiscent of Singer’s observation that property rights are both stable
and contingent. SINGER, supra note 21, at 86 (“Stability of a particular property right is achieved
only through a conception of property rules that makes other property rights contingent on not
interfering with the right we want to make stable.”).
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this area of law and the frequent targets for law reform. 154 These issues
can distract from a more general observation, however, that the law of
servitudes often mediates between competing reliance interests that
change over time, both in their creation and in their destruction.
Most servitudes are the product of voluntary transactions that
are memorialized in writing and recorded. 155 But not all are.
Prescriptive easements follow the same internal logic as adverse
possession. 156 They arise out of consistent adverse use of another’s land
for enough time. They therefore protect the reasonable reliance of the
adverse user as it solidifies over time.
Just as servitudes can arise through reliance by the benefitted
party, servitudes can also terminate if the reliance ends. 157 Servitudes
are powerful precisely because they run with the land and not only with
the parties to the original agreement. 158 But property law provides two
important mechanisms for avoiding servitudes that have become stale
or pointless over time: waiver and the changed conditions doctrine.
Waiver operates exactly as it sounds. Conventionally, if owners
of property in a subdivision (or property otherwise benefitted by a
servitude) do not seek to enforce a restriction on burdened property
within the subdivision—say a residential-only requirement—then they
waive the right to enforce it on other property in the subdivision. 159 This
is best explained in terms of evolutionary reliance. In general, courts
enforce covenants to protect the reliance interests of benefitted

154. See, e.g., Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of Property
Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1222 (1988) (“The murkiness of the law is compounded by
obsolete terminology and by old doctrines whose functions now seem completely mysterious.”).
155. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 3:5, at 129 (2019) (“The most common method of creating an easement is by express grant.”).
156. See id. § 5:1, at 293 (“The process of obtaining an easement by prescription is closely
analogous to that of securing title to land by adverse possession.”).
157. Courts vary in what counts as the end of reliance. Compare W. Land Co. v. Truskolaski,
495 P.2d 624, 625 (Nev. 1972) (holding that restrictive covenants will continue to be enforced so
long as they “remain of substantial value to the” dominant tenements and enforcing them would
not be “inequitable or oppressive”), with Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 878 P.2d 1275,
1278 (Cal. 1994) (holding that restrictive covenants will continue to be enforced unless the
“plaintiff owner can show that the burdens it imposes on affected properties so substantially
outweigh the benefits of the restriction that it should not be enforced against any owner”).
158. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 617–20 (1985) (surveying the landscape).
159. This is closely related to the doctrine of abandonment and, for present purposes, is
functionally indistinguishable. For an articulation of the doctrinal difference, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.4 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2000): “The principal factual difference
between waiver and abandonment is that waiver usually involves failure to object to a particular
violation of a servitude under circumstances that lead to the conclusion that the beneficiary is
precluded from objecting to different but similar violations.”
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parties. 160 However, their failure to enforce the restrictions against
defectors suggests that the owners of benefitted property are not, in
fact, relying on the restrictions. As one court articulated it, waiver of a
covenant occurs when one “does something which is inconsistent with
the right or his intention to rely upon it.” 161 Failure to enforce a
covenant demonstrates an absence of reliance. Simultaneously, owners
of burdened property can begin to rely on shifting rules. If others are
allowed to develop nonresidential uses, owners of other burdened
parcels may begin to expect to be able to as well. Expectations regarding
the use of the property are governed only preliminarily by the recorded
servitudes and can then be altered and shaped by evolving practice on
the ground.
The changed conditions doctrine is similar. Where conditions in
the area have changed sufficiently since the servitude was created, the
owner of property burdened by the servitude can sue for its termination
as a matter of law. 162 Plaintiffs must clear a high bar. In the old case of
Reeves v. Comfort, 163 Plaintiffs sought to invalidate a covenant
restricting their property in a subdivision to single family residential
use, arguing that the growth of Atlanta had made an apartment
building there much more valuable. The court reasoned that the
defendants had purchased their nearby property “in full reliance upon
the restrictive covenants in the deeds to other purchasers of lots in the
same subdivision.” 164 Protecting that reliance interest was more
important than unlocking the value in Plaintiffs’ property.
Conventionally, courts hold that changed conditions requires a
showing that the original purpose of the covenant can no longer be
realized. 165 In other words, the owners of benefitted property are
entitled to continue to rely on the restriction so long as its purpose has

160. See, e.g., Simms v. Lakewood Vill. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 895 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995) (upholding restrictive covenant because “[t]here is evidence that some lot owners purchased
their property because of, and in reliance on, the fact that this was a restricted subdivision”).
161. Cochran v. Bentley, 251 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Ark. 2007) (emphasis added).
162. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 45, at 546 (“The changed conditions doctrine is simple and
succinct: when conditions have so changed since the making of the covenant that it is no longer
possible to secure in substantial measure the benefits originally contemplated, the covenant is
unenforceable.”).
163. 157 S.E. 629 (Ga. 1931).
164. Id. at 631; see also Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. City of Des Plaines, 336 N.E.2d 8, 17 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (“[C]hanges outside the [subdivision], standing alone, should not be allowed to
abrogate the restrictions to the detriment of lot owners within the subdivision who relied on the
restrictions.”).
165. Menne v. Keowee Key Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 629 S.E.2d 690, 694 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“A
party seeking to annul a restrictive covenant must show the change of conditions represented so
radical a change that the original purpose of the restrictive covenant can no longer be realized.”).
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not been thwarted. 166 But the point, again, is that reliance is dynamic,
and change can occur through the passage of time. 167

D. The Rule Against Perpetuities
Even the arcane rule against perpetuities reflects the ways in
which reliance in resources can shift over time. The rule, which any
property student knows, states that any contingent future interest
must either vest or fail within twenty-one years of the death of a life in
being at the time of the conveyance. 168 In effect, it prohibits grantors
from encumbering or directing the disposition of property beyond a
certain amount of time, namely, a generation, plus twenty-one years.
Grantees within this amount of time may have restrictions imposed on
their property rights, but attempts to limit property for longer are void
ab initio. 169
As Gregory Alexander recognized in his leading history of deadhand control, courts long invoked the principle of free alienability to
prohibit grantors from encumbering property at all. 170 Courts reasoned
that recipients of property should be free to use and dispose of the
property as they want. Starting in the nineteenth century, however,
courts in the United States began to realize that alienability is a zerosum game. 171 Failing to enforce grantors’ restrictions interferes with
their free alienability as it simultaneously protects grantees. One way
of thinking about the rule against perpetuities, then, is as a kind of
temporal compromise between grantors and grantees. 172
As between the grantor and the grantee, the rule against
perpetuities allows the grantor to control the disposition of property for
a long time, but not forever. The rule recognizes, implicitly, that
grantors’ reliance on the property—and, specifically, the ability to
166. SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Ass’n v. Lalla, 781 S.E.2d 115, 125 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(“Notwithstanding the changed character, when one protected by a covenant seeks enforcement
thereof, we cannot endorse the change while the purpose of the covenant may still be
accomplished.”).
167. Some states have laws on the books that regulate this same tradeoff. So-called “stale use”
statutes extinguish deed restrictions that are not periodically renewed. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
§ 614.24 (2021).
168. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942).
169. See, e.g., Frederick R. Schneider, A Rule Against Perpetuities for the Twenty-First
Century, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 743, 751 (2007) (describing the rule).
170. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1190–91 (1985).
171. See id.
172. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 949 (2011) (describing rule as an “awkward compromise”
between the interests of grantors and grantees).
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restrict the property—declines over time. Simultaneously, grantees
increasingly rely on outright ownership of the property as the source of
any encumbrance fades further into the mists of time.
It may seem problematic to justify the rule in terms of grantors’
and grantees’ competing reliance interests. A grantor, after all, cannot
rely on property after death, and even slow, accretive evolutionary
reliance comes to a hard stop at the grave. 173 But a better analysis
recognizes that it is the grantors’ reliance at the time of the grant that
the law appears to vindicate. There, the grantor is relying on the fact
that the law will enforce any encumbrance within the perpetuities
period. Indeed, grantors might not make certain gifts or dispositions of
property if that were not the case. In essence, the rule against
perpetuities represents a kind of crude, ex ante compromise between
grantors’ and grantees’ interests far into the future. And at this high
level of generality, it again reflects a vision of evolutionary reliance.

E. The Takings Clause
These same issues also appear in the regulation of property,
where courts have long acknowledged—if only in passing—the dynamic
nature of expectations surrounding property rights. The Takings
Clause represents the clearest point of intersection between private
rights and public power. While it explicitly prohibits the government
from taking property for public use without just compensation, 174 courts
have struggled to define what kinds of government actions rise to the
level of a taking. 175 It is a fraught and contested doctrine, requiring
compensation if the regulation “goes too far,” according to the cryptic
phrase from the Supreme Court. 176
The overarching framework for identifying a taking comes from
the eponymous ad hoc balancing test in Penn Central v. New York. 177
Its three factors include: the character of the regulation, the resulting
173. See id. at 947 (“[F]ailing to enforce some dead-hand restriction over property has no
meaningful effect on the welfare of the testator who is, after all, dead.”).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
175. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (“This area of the law has been
characterized by ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of
all the relevant circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Christopher Serkin,
The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
677, 741 (2005) (“Looking for consistency in takings cases is a little bit like finding shapes in the
clouds: you can see them if you look hard enough, but they say more about the observer than the
clouds themselves.”).
176. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
177. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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diminution in value, and the extent of the regulation’s interference with
distinct investment-backed expectations. 178 It is that last prong that
directly implicates reliance interests and implicitly recognizes their
dynamic nature.
As interpreted by courts, the “investment-backed expectations”
prong distinguishes between those relatively concrete plans for
property and those more fanciful pie-in-sky aspirations. 179 Interfering
with the former can violate the Takings Clause, while interfering with
the latter is generally not constitutionally cognizable. 180 A developer
cannot complain if the government prevents her from using property in
a way that she never should have expected to use the property in the
first place—a regulation prohibiting the development of factories in
residential neighborhoods is no taking.
The perennial problem is deciding what counts as distinct or
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 181 In Penn Central itself,
the Court observed that a property owner’s primary investment-backed
expectation is the property’s current, existing use. 182 Frank Michelman
used the phrase “crystalized” expectations in his famous explication of
the meaning of the Takings Clause. 183 Broadly speaking, courts require
a property owner to show some specific plans—architectural
renderings, permit applications, and the like—to demonstrate how he
or she actually intended to develop the property. 184 In effect, the
property owner must demonstrate actual reliance on using the property
in a particular way, and not merely the invention of some higher-valued
use ex post. 185 The point of the test, in other words, is to distinguish
those expectations on which a property owner actually relied from those
that are invented later. And importantly, those expectations can change
over time. The same regulation might not be a taking as applied to a
178. Id.
179. Serkin, supra note 35, at 1251; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice
Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 560 (2002) (characterizing transformation as a move from a
subjective to an objective standard); J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are
Investment-Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. L. 81, 85
(2006) (“Together, these decisions redirected the expectations inquiry away from the impact of
regulation and toward the appropriateness of the landowners’ land use expectations . . . .”).
180. See Eagle, supra note 179, at 559–65.
181. For discussion of the evolution of the test from “distinct” to “reasonable,” see
Breemer, supra note 179.
182. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (“[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way
with the present uses of the Terminal. . . . So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”).
183. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
184. Breemer, supra note 179, at 84.
185. Id.
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property owner with no bold plans, but a cognizable taking as applied
to a developer who has made concrete steps to develop her property. 186
There is additional doctrinal confusion about how reasonable
expectations can develop in the context of the Takings Clause, and those
are considered in more detail in Part III. But here it is enough to see
that the heart of the Penn Central test implicates an evolving sense of
expectations and, therefore, shifting reliance on uses of property.
III. REEVALUATING PROPERTY
The argument so far has been primarily descriptive. Reasoning
inductively from existing property doctrine, a new view of property
emerges. In contrast to a neoliberal model of property as the stable raw
material for voluntary transactions, it sees property as mediating
between reliance interests that shift over time. This Part applies that
insight to some of the thorniest property controversies in both private
and public law contexts. Focusing on evolutionary reliance also has
immediate doctrinal consequences for both common law property
doctrines and for rights against the state.
A. What Property Does
It may seem trite if not banal to argue that property protects
reliance. In fact, property and reliance may seem like synonyms to
many people. But excavating the role of evolutionary reliance as a
source of property rights comes with some important conceptual payoffs
considered here (and doctrinal payoffs, considered below).
For one, recognizing how property rights can protect reliance
interests that arise organically over time blurs the boundary between
owners and nonowners. People rely on resources all the time, whether
they own them or not. 187 If the role of property is to protect reliance,
then people will sometimes have property claims to resources already
owned by others. Of course, reliance does not automatically give rise to
a protectable interest; a neighbor’s reliance on an open view does not
necessarily prevent development on a vacant parcel. But framing
property as mediating between competing reliance interests invites a
more nuanced and substantive inquiry than simply assigning all rights
automatically to the owner. It recognizes that the category of “owner” is
186. See John J. Delaney & Emily Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected
Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 27, 29 (1996) (“[T]o successfully pursue a takings claim, one must possess development
expectations recognized by state law which are reasonable enough to form a property interest.”).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
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a kind of legal conclusion that one party’s reliance interests trump
another’s in a particular context. 188 While this will often result in
protecting the rights of owners as traditionally labeled, it elevates
others’ claims. Their reliance is not a peripheral constraint on
ownership but is itself a source of property rights.
For another, this account puts change at the heart of property.
Instead of seeing property as a legal tool that always promotes stability,
it recasts property as promoting a kind of constrained dynamism, with
rights that can shift naturally over time. Through the process of slow,
accretive changes, property law’s focus on reliance can allow rights to
emerge and disappear.
Stability is admittedly a central feature of property. It is what
allows people to rely on resources, to plan for future conduct, and to
make investments that pay off over time. 189 But too much stability risks
fossilizing entitlements. Property rights do not need to be perpetual to
be stable, and the value of stability may decrease as the temporal
horizon stretches further into the future. 190 The substantive question
should always be whether and to what extent a particular reliance
should be protected to secure property’s benefits. For example, the
difference in value today of an easement that lasts for, say, two hundred
years versus one hundred years may be very slight indeed. 191
188. This argument mirrors long-standing observations about possession as a source of
property, where possession is itself a legal conclusion and not a justification for assigning rights.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25 (1979)
(describing complex legal rules that determine who is in possession of a resource).
189. See Beitz, supra note 21, at 429 (“A rational agent who takes possession of a thing without
a secure expectation of retaining exclusive access to it for as long as she wishes would tend to
underinvest in the thing because she could not count on gaining the full benefit of her
investment.”); see also Fennell, supra note 82, at 1963 (“Rights that run with assets respond to the
fact that property interests in other people’s land, such as easements, exhibit a form of temporal
lumpiness: they are often most valuable when consumed over long periods that are not interrupted
by changes in ownership.”); Brunner, supra note 23, at 302 (“[According to Bentham,] the means
of legislators to enable citizens to gain lasting and certain pleasures is by protecting their private
property over time.”).
190. Cf. Beitz, supra note 21, at 428:
Certainly the interest in self-determination would not be well served if the term were
too short . . . . On the other hand, it is not obvious that the term needs to stretch to the
end of the life of an owner: conceivably there might be a term short of a lifetime such
that one could still succeed in carrying out one’s plans . . . .;
Harding, supra note 47, at 292 (footnote omitted):
[J]ust as the notion of absolute ownership is a myth, so too the idea of perpetual
ownership has never been accurate. . . . [W]hile an intent of “lasting control” might be
important in establishing property rights, real control over too long a period of time can
be used to quash those very same interests.
191. How much would you pay for rights to a house for two hundred years? Would you pay
much less if the rights were for one hundred years? See Christopher Serkin & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102
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This is true of nonmonetary values as well. Property as
personhood, 192 as instrumental in securing liberty, 193 or as committed
to human flourishing 194 all can be obtained with less than permanent
and immutable rights. Stability and predictability in ownership and
property rights are crucial to some extent. However, all or most of the
benefits of ownership under any theory can be secured with rights that
are not rigid in perpetuity, especially if changes occur with enough
advance notice, or over a long enough period of time for people to have
a chance to adjust expectations.
Expectations, in this regard, are like a car’s headlights on a dark
night, shining ahead a fixed distance but always moving forward. If
those headlights were to go out suddenly, the car would likely crash.
But if the headlights gradually dim, the driver will naturally slow down
to keep pace with her visibility. She also might eventually stop if the
headlights go dark, but at that point will be going too slowly to crash. 195
How quickly the headlights can fade will depend on the speed of the car
and the brightness of the lights to begin with. This is the same kind of
analysis required of property.
How quickly property can allow changes to occur depends on the
nature of the resource and the substantive interests at stake. 196 This
analysis cannot be done in the abstract. But it is nevertheless possible
to identify specific doctrines and areas of law that would benefit from a
more explicit focus on evolutionary reliance and the pace of change. And
it is sometimes possible to identify some places where a particular
reliance interest is especially important to vindicate. 197 In the doctrines
MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1059 (2018) (“A regulation that grandfathers an existing use for a hundred
years, for example, will have very little impact on the value of the property today . . . .”).
192. See Radin, supra note 21, at 741–42; see also Radin, supra note 105, at 968 (“If an object
you now control is bound up in your future plans or in your anticipation of your future self . . . then
your personhood depends in part on the realization of these expectations.”).
193. See ELY, supra note 25.
194. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 757 (2009) (discussing social obligations tethered to property ownership);
PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 61, 65–66 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010).
195. Cf. How Far Can You See When Driving at Night?, DRIVESMARTBC (June 11, 2013, 8:54
PM),
https://www.drivesmartbc.ca/miscellaneous/how-far-can-you-see-when-driving-night
[https://perma.cc/TPR6-FK8Z] (offering an amusingly retro video that describes the importance of
not “overdriving” your headlights).
196. For Bentham’s view, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
197. This methodology is deliberately reminiscent of Frank Michelman’s towering work on the
Takings Clause. See Michelman, supra note 183. In deciding whether to offer compensation for a
burdensome regulation, he proposed asking courts to evaluate the extent of demoralization
resulting from not compensating—that is, the foregone investments in property, and the genuine
demoralization costs of uncompensated burdens on property. He did not propose a case-by-case
inquiry, but instead identified broad categories in which demoralization costs were likely to be
especially high, as, for example, when the government permanently invades property or
dramatically reduces its value. Others have imported the idea of demoralization costs into other
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that follow, reliance provides a helpful new way of framing perennial
problems. At the least, it offers a framework for evaluating reliance in
different specific property doctrines.
So, what does it mean to take seriously the nature of accretive
change in the reliance interest in property? It has immediate doctrinal
consequences for both common law property doctrines and for rights
against the state.
B. Evolutionary Reliance in Private Law
1. Coming to the Nuisance. The dynamic nature of evolutionary
reliance in property suggests some new ways of thinking about even the
most familiar doctrines. Consider, first, the “coming to the nuisance”
defense. 198 The law of nuisance proscribes the use of property in a way
that substantially and unreasonably interferes with another’s use of
her property. 199 In the main, a nuisance is not per se unreasonable, but
only a nuisance because of its proximity to some other use. A pig farm
or feedlot, for example, may be entirely permissible in an agricultural
area but inappropriate in a residential one. 200 But what if the pig farm
was there first, and the residential area developed later around it?
Nuisance law often involves a problem of timing. 201

areas of property theory. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 10, at 55–56 (comparing the advantages and
disadvantages of class-based property transfers through the lens of demoralization costs).
198. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, First Come First Serve: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to
the Nuisance,” 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 559 (1980) (discussing coming to the nuisance).
199. See, e.g., O’Cain v. O’Cain, 473 S.E.2d 460, 466 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“A nuisance is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property.”).
200. See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 1963) (pig farm); Spur Indus., Inc.
v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (cattle feedlot); Martin A. Levitin, Change of
Neighborhood in Nuisance Cases, 13 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 340, 341–43 (1964) (discussing
agricultural nuisances). For consideration of the nuisance impacts of pig farms in particular, see
Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North Carolina, 121 ENV’T.
HEALTH PERSPS., June 2013, at A182, A183, noting that “On the coastal plain of eastern North
Carolina, families in certain rural communities daily must deal with the piercing, acrid odor of hog
manure—reminiscent of rotten eggs and ammonia—wafting from nearby industrial hog farms.”
201. See, e.g., Cordato, supra note 85, at 273 (“This paper reexamines the efficiency arguments
that are made regarding coming to the nuisance and argues that the entire discussion has been
cast in an inappropriate analytical framework. A problem that by definition involves the passage
of time has been forced-fit into a static equilibrium framework of analysis.”); see also Spur Indus.,
494 P.2d at 707 (internal quotation marks omitted):
The case affords, perhaps, an example where a business established at a place remote
from population is gradually surrounded and becomes part of a populous center, so that
a business which formerly was not an interference with the rights of others has become
so by the encroachment of the population.
Of course, where both uses are changing simultaneously, it is not always possible to say who
got there first. See Spur Indus., 494 P.2d at 704 (describing development of residential subdivision
as happening alongside expansion of feedlot).
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A preexisting use was, at one time, immune from nuisance
liability. 202 This so-called “coming to the nuisance” defense gave de facto
preference to whatever use was in place initially. However, almost
every American jurisdiction has now abrogated the coming to the
nuisance defense. 203 Courts have reasoned that the mere fact of first-intime should not lock in a use that has become inappropriate. 204 The
issue at any given moment should be whether a particular use is
appropriate in a particular place. The fact that a use was in place first
may be one of a number of relevant considerations, but it is no longer a
complete defense.
Focusing on evolutionary reliance interests, however, suggests a
different analysis. A relevant consideration—perhaps the relevant
consideration—should be the pace of change in the area. Contrast, for
example, a feedlot that finds itself suddenly surrounded by a new
residential subdivision built over a short period of time with a feedlot
that finds itself surrounded by residential uses that have developed
slowly over years or decades. The end result is the same: a feedlot in
the middle of a residential neighborhood. But the nature and the rate
of change should matter. 205 In a suit by residential neighbors, a relevant
consideration should be whether the feedlot owner’s reliance had the
opportunity to evolve. Each new house over the years would have made
the feedlot slowly but surely more out of place. The feedlot owner would
have had an opportunity to adjust his or her expectations, to see the
change afoot, and—willingly or not—to have recognized a shift in the
character of the area.
The availability of the coming to the nuisance defense should
therefore depend on the pace of change in the area, and not just the
conflict between the incompatible uses when the nuisance litigation
arises. This, in turn, depends on the nature of the competing uses. For
example, a giant feedlot operation in place for years could receive more
202. George P. Smith, II & Matthew Saunig, Reconceptualizing the Law of Nuisance Through
A Theory of Economic Captivity, 75 ALB. L. REV. 57, 63 (2012) (“Early common law, dating back to
the Nineteenth Century, recognized ‘coming to the nuisance’ as a valid defense to a nuisance
claim.”).
203. See Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (“The
majority view [of jurisdictions] rejects the doctrine of coming to the nuisance as an
absolute defense . . . .” (quoting Lawrence v. E. Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955))).
204. See Smith & Saunig, supra note 202, at 64 (“Many courts found that the concept of ‘coming
to the nuisance’ was contrary to public policy and the common good.”); see also Levitin, supra note
200, at 345 (summarizing the law in transition as of 1964).
205. Cf. Cordato, supra note 85, at 281 (“The passage of time implies the addition of
information that did not previously exist and the discarding of information that has become
irrelevant.”). Cordato focuses on the inevitable effects of knowledge and preferences changing over
time, and the effect of such changes on Coasean bargaining, but not the pace of change or any
effect on reliance interests. See id.
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protection from nuisance claims than a smaller scale operation that was
accessory to—and not essential to—other agricultural uses. Any specific
outcome will obviously require keen sensitivity to context. But focusing
on the shifting nature of the competing reliance interests reframes the
application of the coming to the nuisance defense. Among property law’s
most essential functions, then, is to ensure that change happens
gradually. This is explicitly to embrace incrementalism and to defend
slow steady changes over short abrupt ones.
2. Bad-Faith Adverse Possession. Another place where the focus
on reliance affects existing doctrine is in the law of adverse possession.
As Part II demonstrated, adverse possession already implicitly
recognizes how reliance interests can shift dynamically over time. But
making this explicit suggests a new inquiry into the requisite mental
state of the adverse possessor.
A perennial question in adverse possession doctrine and theory
is whether an adverse possession claim should be available only to goodfaith adverse possessors, whether the claim should be available only to
bad-faith adverse possessors, or whether the knowledge and mental
state of the adverse possessor should matter at all. 206 There is both case
law and theory supporting each position. 207 But to the extent adverse
possession vindicates the competing reliance interests of the owner and
the adverse possessor, the question should be whether and to what
extent the adverse possessor’s mental state affects that trade-off.
A moment’s reflection reveals that the adverse possessor’s
mental state is irrelevant to the owner’s reliance. The owner’s reliance
is a fact about her relationship to the property and is unaffected by an
adverse possessor’s subjective beliefs about ownership. But mental
state may affect the adverse possessor’s reliance.
If you use a thing—or land—that you know belongs to someone
else, you are aware that your use is contingent on ongoing, if tacit,
consent. There is always a chance that the resource will be taken away
and so reliance develops more slowly than if you erroneously believe it
to be yours. 208 It does still develop, however. For a trivial but familiar
example, think of a nice jacket left in your home after a party. You know
it belongs to someone else, and so you probably leave it in the closet for
206. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 117, at 2430 (discussing the various mental state
requirements employed in different jurisdictions).
207. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession,
100 NW U. L. REV. 1037, 1046–49 (2006) (describing existing doctrine).
208. Cf. Coxfame, Whats a Squatter? $330K Home for $16.00!, YOUTUBE (Nov. 23, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxVL1kut7qM
[https://perma.cc/64GV-5BY9]
(KHOU
newscast discussing squatting by adverse possessor in Texas, where adverse possessor asserts his
rights but invests only minimally in the property because of the insecurity of his claim).
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some time, waiting for the owner to return. But eventually, you might
take it out and wear it, still knowing that it is held in a kind of bailment
for the true owner, if he or she should come back for it. But with the
passage of enough time, you may start to rely on the jacket. And with
the passage of still more time, you might come to view your claim as
even stronger than the true owner’s. Psychologically, this is the
equivalent of the bad-faith adverse possessor. 209 Reliance may still
develop but more slowly than if you genuinely but wrongly believed that
the jacket was yours.
Focusing on reliance therefore suggests that bad-faith adverse
possession should still be able to ripen into ownership, but over a longer
period of time. This is consistent with a proposal that Richard Epstein
made several decades ago, arguing for a longer statute of limitations for
bad-faith adverse possession. 210 But he was primarily concerned with
evidentiary issues, arguing that the passage of time implicates a tradeoff between “principle” and “proof.” The principle, in his view, is that
the stability of property rights should prevail. But matters of proof can
cut the other way, and so at some point the law should vindicate the
rights of the possessor even over the rights of the prior owner. 211
While the doctrinal result is the same, the justification here is
notably different. Focusing on reliance reveals that adverse possession
is not an unfortunate concession to the limitations of evidence but is
instead a vindication of the reliance interests of the possessor. And the
justification for a two-tiered statute of limitations is not, as Epstein
suggested, merely about making it more difficult for the bad-faith
adverse possessor to prevail but is instead a reflection of the different
rates at which reliance solidifies in the good-faith and bad-faith
possessors. In other words, the proposal here is to conform the law of
adverse possession to the phenomenology of reliance, instead of viewing
it as a compromise between the “right” answer and the limits of human
knowledge.
3. Changed Conditions. The changed conditions doctrine in the
law of servitudes, described briefly above, also finds added justification
by focusing on evolutionary reliance. 212 Changed conditions is wellsettled as conventional property doctrine, but conceptually problematic.
In early work, Richard Epstein criticized the existence of the doctrine

209. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing bad-faith adverse possession).
210. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 686–88.
211. See id. at 674 (“It does not take a profound knowledge of human cognition or motivation
to conclude that all evidence decays with time.”).
212. See supra Part II.A.4.
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as violating freedom of contract. 213 He argued that courts should defer
absolutely to the bargains that the parties struck when they created the
servitude, and that, “given the pervasive ignorance over the trade-off
between the virtues of flexibility and certainty, and between the vices
of indefiniteness and rigidity, there is simply no persuasive reason to
embrace one extreme to the exclusion of the other.” 214
A decade later, Glen Robinson again criticized the changed
conditions doctrine in a lengthy treatment. He looked first at
justifications sounding in contract: frustration of purpose and efficient
breach. 215 He found the former did not capture the doctrine in practice,
because courts did not apply it as a default rule but instead forbade
parties from bargaining around it, unlike in contracts. 216 Most relevant
here, he also argued that it is not appropriate for property law to adapt
to owners’ changed preferences over time. 217 His general point was that
courts should not intervene to allow property rights to shift simply
because conditions in the world have changed. For him, the gradual
nature of change was a reason for rejecting the doctrine wholesale. As
he put it, “Preference changes do not occur as discrete events,
distinctively defining a succession of personalities. Rather . . . changes
in basic preferences are scalar in character.” 218 He agreed it was “dotty”
to think that the law could incorporate such gradual changes. 219
It is not dotty, however. It is, in fact, another example of the
law’s recognition of evolutionary reliance. In a leading treatment of the
topic, Gregory Alexander viewed the problem of changed conditions as
a particular example of the broader phenomenon of “legal
obsolescence.” 220 As he succinctly framed the issue: “The obsolescence
problem is not peculiar to servitudes; it is a function of duration, and it
exists in all legal arrangements that have extended time
horizons . . . .” 221 That is exactly right, and property law manages the
213. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1364–66 (1981).
214. Id. at 1366.
215. See Robinson, supra note 45, at 551–80 (differentiating between frustration of purpose
and changed conditions).
216. Id. at 546. He also argued that a contract lens could, at best, justify substituting
injunctive relief with damage remedies, but not the full-throated revocation of servitudes through
conventional application of the changed conditions doctrine. Id.
217. Id. at 566 (“[T]here is no necessary relationship between the legal rule that relates to
changes in external contingencies and the altered preferences problem.”).
218. Id. at 566–67 (footnote omitted).
219. Id. at 567. In support of the characterization, Robinson quoted the Cheshire Cat in Alice
in Wonderland, saying “It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life.” Id.
220. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 898 (1988).
221. Id.
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obsolescence problem in its own way, simply by moderating the pace of
change.
It is perhaps telling that many of the examples scholars raise to
motivate the problem of changed conditions involve avulsive changes.
Glen Robinson, for example, imagined a new highway that
unexpectedly opens encumbered land to valuable new commercial
uses. 222 One of the leading cases reproduced in property casebooks is
Rick v. West. 223 There, a developer subdivided property and sold a parcel
to the defendant subject to covenants limiting that parcel, along with
the rest of the parcels, to residential use. Nearly contemporaneously,
the developer sold an additional forty-five acres to an “industrialist,”
who in turn conveyed part of the property to a hospital. This resulted
in a challenge to the validity of the covenant and a claim of changed
conditions. 224 The shift from residential to commercial use happened
over a short time span—five years from the original sale to the
defendant. This was not a case where the area changed gradually, but
instead involved an abrupt change in the developer’s plans for his
property. Indeed, the court observed explicitly that “[t]here is no
evidence of any substantial change in the general neighborhood.” 225
Focusing on reliance suggests that the pace of change in the area
should matter. If the change outpaces owners’ ability to adapt, then
courts should enforce property rights to moderate that pace of change.
In other words, courts should be more skeptical of changed conditions
claims to address quick changes—like the surprise construction of a
new road or the sudden development of a hospital in a residential
neighborhood—as opposed to slower, more gradual changes in
community character.
Some case law implicitly supports this approach. In contrast to
Rick v. West, which rejected application of the changed conditions
doctrine, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Muilenburg v. Blevins
struck down restrictive covenants because of the extent of the change
in the character of the community. 226 The court there focused on the age
of the covenant: it dated back to 1911 and had been in place for fortyfour years. The court also characterized the nature of the change in the
neighborhood, noting “the great growth of the City of Charlotte in the
222. See Robinson, supra note 45, at 561.
223. 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 887 (7th ed. 2010).
224. Rick, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (setting out claims).
225. Id. at 199; see also Martin v. City of Seattle, 765 P.2d 257, 264 (Wash. 1988) (Callow, J.,
dissenting) (noting in passing that “[i]n this area of the city there has been little change over the
decades”)
226. 87 S.E.2d 493, 496–97 (N.C. 1955) (affirming the nullification of restrictive covenants
after a residential community developed into a business community).
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past 15 or 20 years and the extension of the city limits.” 227 The Blevins
court focused on all of the competing uses that had developed nearby:
an “apartment house,” a “plumbing and heating establishment,” an
“office building,” and a “filling station.” 228 And based on the extent of
the changes over the nearly half century, the court applied the changed
conditions doctrine to invalidate the covenant. That is exactly the right
kind of inquiry.
The claim here is, in fact, counterintuitive. Changes that are
unexpected and quick should be less likely to invalidate a covenant than
changes that are slow and accretive. That seems backwards, at least
from the perspective of contract law. If the changed conditions doctrine
is seen as a species of frustration of purpose, then sudden and
unforeseeable changes should be more likely to invalidate the original
agreement. 229 But viewed as a species of property, the evolutionary
nature of reliance suggests the opposite: where covenants become
obsolete slowly over time, parties’ reliance is allowed to shift and adjust
to changes in the character of the community.
Instead of viewing the changed conditions doctrine as an inapt
application of contract doctrine, it is better seen as reflecting the
dynamic nature of evolutionary reliance in property. Pointedly,
Robinson is wrong to assume that the law is flummoxed by
incremental—scalar—change. 230 Rather, that is precisely what legal
rules like the changed conditions doctrine properly incorporate.
4. Waste. The law of waste prohibits a life-estate holder (or
tenant) from acting, or failing to act, in a way that interferes with the
interests of remainder beneficiaries or other future interest holders
(including landlords). 231 This creates the potential for conflict that is
addressed through the doctrine of waste, which allows remaindermen
to sue to protect their rights to the property in the future. 232 This, too,
mediates competing reliance interests, but the law could better
acknowledge the way those reliance interests change over time.
The present possessor of a life estate, for example, is entitled to
rely on the property for her lifetime, but she has no control over what
227. Id. at 494.
228. Id. at 496–97.
229. See Robinson, supra note 45, at 552 (discussing frustration of purpose).
230. See id.
231. See, e.g., Sally Brown Richardson, Reframing Ameliorative Waste, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
335, 336 (2017) (“The doctrine of waste governs what actions—and inactions—the possessor may
take.”).
232. See id. (highlighting the conflict between present and future possessors); Gus G.
Tamborello, “A House Divided”: The Rights and Duties of Homesteaders, Life Tenants &
Remaindermen, 9 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 29, 48 (2016) (“A life tenant may be held liable
for waste if the vested interests of a future holder is damaged.”).
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happens to the property after death (in the absence of a prespecified
testamentary power of appointment). 233 As a life-estate holder ages and
confronts the limits of the life estate, there arises an incentive to
overconsume the remaining value of the property. This can take the
form of reaping too much of the economic value, like cutting too many
trees, mining, or otherwise trying to strip resources from the land. 234
But it can also come in the form of neglect, which can deplete the value
of property just as surely as can affirmative destruction. 235 The doctrine
of waste can step in to protect the rights of remaindermen from such
predictable overconsumption.
Waste often implicates complicated trade-offs between parties
with competing interests in a resource. 236 But the most interesting
questions arise in the context of ameliorative waste, where a life-estate
holder seeks to change the property to increase its value, for example
by tearing down a dilapidated barn, 237 demolishing a house in an
industrial area, 238 or replacing a drafty mansion with an apartment
building. 239 There is a dispute among courts and scholars whether

233. See, e.g., 56 N.Y. JUR. 2D Estates, Powers, & Restraints on Alienation § 58 (footnotes
omitted):
Upon the death of the life tenant, his or her title to the property forming the corpus of
the life estate is extinguished. . . . However, . . . a life estate may be terminated sooner
than the life tenant’s death, by a contingency provided for in the instrument creating
the life estate.
234. See Jackson v. Don Johnson Forestry, Inc., 830 S.E.2d 659, 664 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)
(“Where there is an unauthorized cutting of trees during a life tenancy, the remaindermen may
seek relief.”); Tamborello, supra note 232, at 48.
235. These alternative dynamics are addressed through the doctrines of affirmative and
permissive waste, respectively. The former allows the remainder beneficiary to sue to stop the
affirmative overuse of the property, and also to recover a share of the value extracted from the
property (if any). In extreme cases, it may even result in premature termination of the life estate
and so forfeiture of the property. The latter allows a remainderman to recover damages, or to
require the life-estate holder to undertake repairs or other reasonable protection of the property.
236. See Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in
American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011) (balancing the autonomy of property owners
with the potential social benefits of public ownership); Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on
the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095 (2011) (responding to Merrill); POSNER, supra note 70,
§ 3.11, at 90–94 (“[T]he common law doctrine of waste . . . mediates between the competing
interests of life tenants and remaindermen.”).
237. See Woodrick v. Wood, No. 65207, 1994 WL 236287, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1994)
(rejecting ameliorative waste claim).
238. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899) (rejecting a claim of waste when
demolishing a mansion increased the property value); see also Merrill, supra note 236 (discussing
the case with illuminating and entertaining photographs).
239. See Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (finding that destruction of the
present residences to erect an apartment building would cause “such an injury to the inheritance”
as to constitute waste); see also Richardson, supra note 231, at 337 (“Ameliorative waste occurs
when the possessor materially alters the property without the consent of the future owner, and
that alteration increases the market value of the property.”).
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ameliorative waste should be actionable at all. 240 Merrill has argued for
protecting the rights of remaindermen to take the property in the form
it was granted. 241 Judge Posner, on the other hand, argued in response
that increases in the value of the property should never constitute
waste, and many states agree. 242 Others have sought middle grounds. 243
The problem, fundamentally, is navigating between the societal
interest in encouraging the productive use of property and the
remaindermen’s interest in taking the property in the form they were
expecting. 244
Courts have generally treated waste as an atemporal, binary
choice: give the rights to the present possessor or the future interest
holder. 245 But their interests are not static. In fact, they change over
time. The expected duration of the present interest, and the corollary
proximity of the remaindermen’s right of possession, affects their
respective reliance on the resource. 246 A remainderman who does not
expect to take possession of property for years or decades has a much
more abstract interest in its condition. True, a present possessory
interest like a life estate, in particular, can always be cut short
unexpectedly. But a remainder beneficiary is likely to experience such
an event as a windfall (if, perhaps, a tragic one), and not an event on
which she could rely. The extent of her reliance depends entirely on her
reasonable assumptions about when she is likely to take possession.
Likewise, the present possessor’s reliance is also influenced—if not
240. See Richardson, supra note 231, at 337–38 (describing the disagreement).
241. Merrill, supra note 236, at 1057.
242. Posner, supra note 236, at 1100; Richardson, supra note 231, at 372 (“[T]he majority rule
today is that when a material change increases the value of the underlying property, the future
owner generally has no recourse against the possessor.”).
243. See, e.g., PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 236 (2014)
(describing a “reasonableness” approach to waste); John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias
in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 588–89 (1996) (arguing that waste analysis
should include social values like preservation).
244. See Merrill, supra note 236, at 1059 (distinguishing between an economic or “social”
conception of property and property as an individual right).
245. Compare Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 128 S.W. 581, 583 (Ark. 1910) (“[I]t is a
rule of universal application that a contingent remainderman may obtain relief in equity by
injunction to prevent waste . . . .”), and Kollock v. Webb, 39 S.E. 339, 343 (Ga. 1901) (“[T]hreatened
waste by any life tenant . . . would be promptly and efficiently restrained by a court of equity upon
application by any remainder-man.”), with Strickland v. Jackson, 134 S.E.2d 661, 661–62 (N.C.
1964) (holding that contingent remaindermen have no grounds for relief when life tenant permits
waste), and Sermon v. Sullivan, 640 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that contingent
remaindermen can obtain an injunction to prevent future waste, but are not entitled to damages
for waste already caused by life tenant).
246. Cf. John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1212
(2007) (“[W]aste doctrine becomes particularly important in moments of radical change when
patterns of land use and development are under intense pressure because the physical,
environmental, social and economic circumstances affecting the underlying property relationship
are changing dramatically.”).
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determined—by how long he expects his interest to last. A young lifeestate holder, or a lessee at the beginning of a lengthy lease, will have
a longer-term reliance on the property than someone nearing the end of
a possessory estate and is likely to make more responsible decisions
with regards to the property.
Courts should consider the competing reliance interests and how
they change over time, giving remainder beneficiaries more rights the
closer their interests are to becoming possessory. This might mean, for
example, that an action for ameliorative waste would not be available
where the life-estate holder is young but could perhaps become
available as the end of the life estate comes closer into view. Or it might
mean that the remedies for a waste action change depending on the
anticipated duration remaining in the possessory estate. Damages may
be appropriate early in the tenure, for example, while injunctions or
even premature termination might be available later. 247 At the very
least, time should be an explicit part of the analysis.
If this seems like an unrealistically granular inquiry, courts in
some contexts already look at actuarial or mortality tables when
dividing the value of property held in a life estate. 248 Specifically, courts
will calculate the present value of a possessory interest, as well as
remainder interests, by consulting the life expectancy of the present
possessory-interest holder. 249 That valuation inquiry reflects how these
competing reliance interests shift over time. That same approach
should be imported into the substantive law of waste.
C. Evolutionary Reliance and the Problem of Legal Change
While property is quintessentially a private right and the focus
so far has been primarily on private law, its contours are often defined
by public law, whether in statutory or regulatory limits, or in
constitutional rules constraining the exercise of state power. And
reliance can evolve here as well.

247. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 189(1) (AM. L. INST. 1936) (listing injunction, damages,
or “other equitable decree appropriate” as possible remedies for waste).
248. See Olin L. Browder, Jr., The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 461, 469–
70 (1962) (discussing different approaches).
249. See, e.g., Miss. State Highway Comm’n. v. Hemphill, 176 So. 2d 282, 287 (Miss. 1965)
(“On remand the trial court should determine the cash value of the damages to the future interest
at the time of the taking. . . . Expert actuarial testimony . . . would be available.”); Brennan v.
Burke, No. 15 MISC. 000010, 2019 WL 2498896, at *4 (Mass. Land Ct. June 13, 2019) (approving
valuation that “calculated the probability of each individual party being alive at any particular
time (his ‘custom mortality tables’), which enabled him to calculate the value of each life estate in
light of the probability that its particular constituent events would occur”), judgment entered, 15
MISC. 000010, 2019 WL 2494433 (Mass. Land Ct. June 13, 2019).
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The Supreme Court made this explicit in its earliest zoning
decision. Zoning in this country dates back to the 1920s, when the
Department of Commerce promulgated the Standard Zoning Enabling
Act as model legislation. Many states adopted it, and local governments
quickly began to engage in comprehensive land use regulation. 250
Property owners initially challenged the very project of zoning, arguing
that creating separate use districts violated substantive due process for
being wholly unrelated to the public’s health, safety, and welfare.
In the seminal case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 251 the Supreme
Court upheld zoning, reasoning that it resembled a kind of ex ante
nuisance prevention, keeping incompatible uses away from each other
and thereby preventing harms before they arose. 252 The question was
what harms zoning would prevent. In resolving this issue, Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Court, identified the changing and dynamic
nature of the relationship between private property and government
power. His reasoning is worth quoting at length:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase and
concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing,
which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity
and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. 253

Ultimately, he suggests that property rights must include the
expectation of regulatory change. 254 Focusing on evolutionary reliance
in public law therefore offers significant conceptual and doctrinal
payoffs, and new insights into some of the most contested issues in
property law.
1. Background Principles of Property and Nuisance Law.
Consider, first, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 255 and the problem of
background principles of state law. A perennial issue in takings
litigation involves the interaction between property owners’
expectations and regulations predating the acquisition of property. The
question is whether or not a property owner can have expectations that
are inconsistent with existing regulations or, to put it differently,
whether expectations are constituted by existing regulations. If so, then
pre-acquisition regulations become immune from takings challenges
250. See, e.g., John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use Regulation on
the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 CITYSCAPE 69, 71 (2005).
251. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
252. Id. at 387–88.
253. Id. at 386–88.
254. Id. at 388–89.
255. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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because an owner should not reasonably expect to be able to put
property to a use that was prohibited at the time he acquired the
property.
Doctrinally, the issue arises in the interaction between
Palazzolo and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 256 In Lucas, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a total wipeout of all economically
beneficial uses of property is a per se taking. 257 However, the Court
identified the important exception of regulations that are consistent
with “background principles of nuisance and property law.” 258 As the
Court reasoned, a regulation is not a taking if it is codifying a
prohibition that existed anyway as a background principle of property.
Where that is true, nothing would have been taken, because the
property owner did not have a right to engage in the activity in the first
place.
The Lucas Court did not explain what constitutes background
principles of property and nuisance law, however. The Court appeared
to have common law nuisance principles most squarely in mind, but the
reasoning could extend more broadly. In Palazzolo, then, a property
owner acquired property following the adoption of regulations
prohibiting filling in wetlands. 259 Despite the presence of the
regulations, the property owner filed permits seeking to fill the
wetlands on his property to build a new campground and recreation
area. Rhode Island denied the permits and Plaintiff sued for a taking.
Rhode Island defended itself on grounds that the pre-acquisition
regulations were background principles of property law and that the
Plaintiff, therefore, could not reasonably expect to fill in the wetlands
on his property. 260

256. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
257. Id. at 1019 (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”).
258. Id. at 1030.
259. The facts are unusual and more complicated than this brief description can capture. In
Palazzolo, the Plaintiff only “acquired” the property following adoption of wetlands regulations
because the property had been owned by a corporation that dissolved by operation of state law.
When that happened, the Plaintiff acquired the property outright as the corporation’s only
shareholder. While the regulations were in place before that transfer, it was a transfer in form
only, and this may have affected the Court’s reasoning. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611–32.
260. Id. at 626 (citation omitted):
The theory underlying the argument that postenactment purchasers cannot challenge
a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these lines: Property rights are
created by the State. So, the argument goes, by prospective legislation the State can
shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased
or took title with notice of the limitation.
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In a fractured decision, the Court rejected Rhode Island’s
defense and held that pre-acquisition regulations are not automatically
background principles of property law. 261 According to the Court, a
regulation either is or is not an unconstitutional burden on property.
Whether property changes hands should not immunize an otherwise
unconstitutional regulation from takings review. Or, as the Court
colorfully concluded, “The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick
into the Lockean bundle [of property].” 262
The Court, however, did not manage to explain how or when a
regulation becomes a background principle of property. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia reasoned that it was irrelevant to a takings claim
that the property was acquired after the challenged regulation went
into effect. 263 Justice Stevens, concurring in part, argued precisely the
opposite: that it should, in fact, be dispositive; a property owner should
not be able to challenge as a taking a regulation that predated
acquisition of the property. 264 And, finally, Justice O’Connor reasoned
that a pre-acquisition regulation should be relevant but not dispositive
with regards to the content of property and nuisance law. 265 How this
applies remains contested and unsettled. 266
Evolutionary reliance offers an answer. It suggests that state
laws and regulations do not automatically become background
principles the moment they are enacted, but become so over time. This
occurs whether or not property has changed hands in the meantime.
Consider, for example, rules governing the destruction of wetlands like
those at issue in Palazzolo. Wetlands received very little protection
prior to the 1970s. 267 Owners of wetlands therefore had every
expectation of being able to fill them in to develop property. When new
261. Id. at 627 (citation omitted).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact that a restriction existed at the time the
purchaser took title . . . should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction
is so substantial as to constitute a taking.” (citation omitted)).
264. Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To the extent that the
adoption of the regulations constitute the challenged taking, petitioner is simply the wrong party
to be bringing this action. If the regulations imposed a compensable injury on anyone, it was on
the owner of the property at the moment the regulations were adopted.”).
265. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under these cases, interference with investmentbacked expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine. Further, the
regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape
the reasonableness of those expectations.”).
266. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2016–
2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 148 (2017) (“Commentators have faulted Justice Scalia for
misapprehending in Lucas the nature of ‘background principles of property and nuisance’—by
assuming that these principles are fixed and static when in fact they are fluid and evolving.”).
267. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Stine, Regulating Wetlands in the 1970s: U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Environmental Organizations, 27 J. FOREST HIST. 60, 60 (1983).
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regulations began to protect wetlands, the burdens appeared to many
commentators to create cognizable takings claims. 268 Those regulations
effected a change in owners’ expectations—indeed, often a sharp
change. But fast forward ten, twenty, or thirty years, and those
objections lose their bite. Today, property owners should not be able to
object to new state laws protecting wetlands, or even to changes in the
content of those laws, whether or not property has changed hands. At
this point, our collective understanding of the ecological importance of
wetlands, and our expectations regarding wetland protection, mean
that state wetlands regulations have become background principles of
property law. 269 To be clear, they were not background principles from
the moment wetlands regulations were enacted, but have become so
over time as property owners’ reliance interests have evolved.
This is not, of course, to argue in retrospect that wetlands
regulations automatically violated the Takings Clause when they were
enacted in the 1970s. They still had to impose a substantial burden on
the owner’s property as a whole and rise to the level of a taking
according to the high standards that courts impose. But it is to suggest
that those takings claims were at least more plausible when they were
closer in time to the enactment of the regulatory restrictions. Today,
those regulations should be defensible under the Lucas exception for
regulations consistent with background principles of property and
nuisance law. The passage of time matters.
2. Judicial Takings. A similar move helps explain and even
justify the otherwise befuddling notion of takings claims against courts.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, 270 a plurality of the Supreme Court opened
the door to so-called judicial takings. Plaintiffs in that case had sued
the Florida Coastal Commission for denying compensation for a beach
renourishment program, arguing that the result of extending the beach
was to create a new stretch of public land between the Plaintiffs’
property and the ocean. 271 In essence, they claimed this was a taking of
their right to own all the way to the water’s edge. Plaintiffs litigated up
to the state supreme court, which rejected the takings claim on grounds
268. Alan S. Rafterman, Note, It’s Not Easy Being Green: The Judicial View of Government
Takings of Private Wetlands, 2 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REP. 155, 162 (1991) (anticipating takings
challenges); Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, Private Property vs. Federal Wetlands
Regulation: Should Private Landowners Bear the Cost of Wetlands Protection?, 33 AM. BUS. L.J.
179, 224 (1995) (“It is very likely that the takings issue will continue to cause controversy for the
federal wetlands regulatory program.”).
269. See generally PAUL A. KEDDY, WETLAND ECOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND CONSERVATION (2d
ed. 2010) (providing background).
270. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
271. Id. at 711–12.
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that Plaintiffs’ claimed property right—to own to the mean high-water
line—was not actually a property right recognized in the state. 272
Plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but now
argued that the Florida Supreme Court had taken their property with
its opinion “redefining” their property rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected the claim,
finding that the Florida Supreme Court was in fact correct about the
substantive content of state law. 273 But the fact that the Court even
engaged in the analysis, with a plurality specifically finding that
judicial takings would be cognizable on different facts, presents a
challenge to the nature and source of property rights. 274 Post-Erie, there
is no higher authority on the content of state property law than the
state supreme court. 275 A state supreme court simply cannot be wrong
about substantive property rights, in the same way the U.S. Supreme
Court cannot be wrong about the meaning of the Constitution. 276 It is
“not final because [it is] infallible, but [it is] infallible only because [it
is] final.” 277 And so, if a state supreme court holds that littoral owners
do not automatically own to the mean high-water mark, or otherwise
makes a proclamation about property, it is difficult to see how any
takings claim could possibly arise.
State courts can, however, interfere with people’s reliance. This
is not the same as saying that state courts are wrong in their
interpretation of state law. Nor does it suggest that new interpretations
or applications of property law are inappropriate. It simply recognizes
that changes can interfere with reliance and can therefore violate the
Takings Clause, at least if they happen too quickly. Nothing in this
approach ossifies state law or prevents state courts from modernizing
property doctrines. But as with legislation, it may constrain the rate of
change, and it recognizes that compensation may be due as a kind of
transition relief when changes occur too rapidly. 278 This approach, then,
preserves state courts’ plenary power over common law property
doctrines without eviscerating all constitutional protections.

272. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1120–21 (Fla.
2008).
273. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 731–32.
274. See Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. Rev. 553, 572
(2012) (noting that property has no meaning independent of state law).
275. See id.
276. Id. (“Judicial takings thus cannot be seen as a means of error correction, since
authoritative state courts cannot be wrong about the content of their own law.”).
277. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
278. See Bloom & Serkin, supra note 274, at 575 (construing judicial takings claims as form of
transition relief from changes to judge-made law).
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3. Regulatory Property. Regulatory property also takes on
additional coherence when viewed through the lens of evolutionary
reliance. Starting in earnest in the 1960s, commentators and then
courts have recognized that people can obtain property rights in
regulatory entitlements. 279 In the beginning, this resulted in extending
important due process protections to government entitlements like
welfare benefits. Today, regulatory property is more likely to involve
commercial interests like grazing permits, radio spectrum, taxi
medallions, and transferable development rights (“TDRs”), to name just
a few. 280 But the tension between stability and regulatory flexibility is
profound.
One of the principal purposes of regulatory property is, in fact,
to induce reliance. 281 Creating grazing rights—instead of relying on
wholly informal or ad hoc interactions between ranchers and
government officials—allows ranchers to rely on their entitlements and
to plan their herd size and other land needs accordingly. 282
A problem frequently arises, however, when some new
regulatory priority or even disruptive technology undermines the
regulatory property. Obvious examples involve efforts to change the
National Flood Insurance Program to try to address people building
(and rebuilding) in flood zones, changes in mineral rights on public
land, or the rise of ride-sharing apps and their threat to taxi
medallions. 283 In those instances, what protection should rights holders
receive when their rights are constituted by the government in the first
place? 284 Can welfare benefits simply be cut off with changes in
279. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause,
42 VT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2017) (“The definitive treatment comes from Charles Reich’s path-breaking
work, The New Property, in which he argued that welfare benefits and other forms of public
assistance should be treated as vested property rights.”).
280. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 102 (discussing regulatory property).
281. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 172, at 936 (“The principal benefit of government
precommitments and their resulting entrenchment is the ability to induce reliance.”).
282. See, e.g., Thomas E. Sheridan, Cows, Condos, and the Contested Commons: The Political
Ecology of Ranching on the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands, 60 HUM. ORG. 141, 144 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted):
Although public-land grazing permits are considered by the agencies to be a granted
privilege rather than private property, they are commonly bought and sold along with
the rest of the ranch. If any of these allotments are lost or the number of animal-unit
months on them significantly reduced, the economic viability of the entire ranch may
be destroyed.
283. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 102, at 916 (“[R]egulatory property has become increasingly
important and valuable in our modern economy, and includes such assets as pollution credits,
fishing quotas, taxi medallions, financial guarantees, and the telecommunications spectrum,
among many others.”).
284. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 102 (discussing property protection for regulatory property
like taxi medallions); Serkin, supra note 6 (discussing regulatory property more generally).
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eligibility criteria, or can mineral rights be eliminated by new
regulations of public lands?
Regulatory property cannot be a one-way ratchet. The creation
of transferable development rights cannot lock in existing zoning
regulations in perpetuity (or at least until all the TDRs are used). 285
That could make the creation of regulatory entitlements impermissibly
entrenching against regulatory or legal change. 286
However, it is equally problematic if regulatory entitlements
could simply be cancelled at any time. There is a reason that theorists
in the 1960s adopted a property framework to defend welfare and other
government benefits from the vicissitudes of regulatory preferences:
property provides strong protection. 287 Moreover, since the purpose of
creating regulatory entitlements is to induce reliance—to encourage
people to invest, for example—it would be self-defeating if future
governments could simply cancel them or undermine their value at any
time. 288 No one would rely on entitlements that are so ephemeral.
Evolutionary reliance offers a new framework for evaluating
changes to regulatory property. Once created, regulatory entitlements
are not locked in forever, because people should expect them to change,
just as they should expect more conventional property rights to change.
But they can also expect that such change will happen gradually.
Canceling all taxi medallions by legislative fiat would be impermissible
on this view, but offering more medallions for sale, experimenting with
ride-sharing platforms, or gradually deploying other options would
represent the kinds of permissible changes that property owners should
expect. 289 The question at all times should be how much stability the
regulatory regime needs to create in order to induce the intended
reliance.
Grazing permits, for example, need to create stable expectations
that allow for appropriate herd management. They do not need to last
forever, but ranchers should have enough advance notice of changes to
be able to adjust their cattle operations without too much disruption.
Mineral rights require different amounts of time depending on how long
it typically takes to develop mines—or gas wells or other extractive
285. Serkin, supra note 102, at 916–17 (extending property protection to regulatory property
“can transform the regulatory regime that creates them into a kind of one-way ratchet that limits
governmental power”).
286. See id. at 915.
287. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969); Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 742, 785–86 (1964).
288. See Serkin, supra note 172, at 934 (“The ability to entrench a policy can create significant
public benefits, principally in the ability to induce reliance by private parties . . . .”).
289. See Wyman, supra note 102.
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technologies—as well as the business model of such extraction. Of
course, holders of such rights should not expect their rights to be
immutable nor protected absolutely. They are not necessarily entitled
to extract the full value of their regulatory entitlements before changes
occur. But nor should they expect the full value to be wiped out without
warning or recourse. The requirement, again, is to protect evolutionary
reliance by ensuring that changes happen incrementally over time.
4. Vesting Rules. Focusing on reliance also provides a new path
forward for evaluating vested rights. The vested rights doctrine is
implicated when a developer faces a regulatory change during the
course of development. 290 For example, someone may buy property and
seek to develop some new intensive use. Either coincidentally or often
in response to a development plan, the local government may change
existing regulations to prohibit or otherwise restrict the use. The
question then arises whether the property and development plans are
subject to the old or the new regulatory regime. The answer depends on
whether or not the development rights have vested. 291
Vesting rules vary by state and are often technical. 292 They
usually involve defining some specific act in the development process
that locks in the existing regulatory regime. 293 Vesting rules often seem
arbitrary, and all invite strategic decisions by the developer, local
officials, or both. In states where development rights vest with site
preparation, for example, developers often race to get a stake in the
ground, simply to lock in existing regulations, even—or especially—if
they know that the government is contemplating a new regulation. 294
The effect can be a kind of race to build in ways that undermine the

290. See Serkin, supra note 35, at 1238 (“The doctrine is usually implicated when a property
owner has begun but not yet completed some project before the government changes the applicable
regulations.”).
291. See id. (“The vested rights doctrine assumes that if a right has vested—that is, if a project
is sufficiently far along—then it is entitled to protection from subsequently enacted land use
regulations . . . .”).
292. See, e.g., Delaney & Vaias, supra note 186, at 32 (“[F]ew, if any, bright-line tests have
emerged concerning vested rights, and the caselaw is often inconsistent and confusing.”).
293. See John J. Delaney, Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A Gaping
Disconnect?, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 603, 607 (2000) (“At least 30 state courts have used the
issuance of a building permit as the principal benchmark for [vested rights], but virtually all of
these courts also require that other actions be taken in reliance upon the permit, such as
construction or expenditure of funds to implement the permit.”); Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall
Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 389–402
(1989) (surveying approaches).
294. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
655, 694 (1995) (“We do know that observers of and participants in the development process believe
that development is accelerated in response to regulatory risk.”).
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efficacy of new regulations. 295 On the other hand, local officials can
sometimes undermine significant investments that developers have
made and frustrate reasonable expectations in the process.
Whatever their doctrinal contours, vesting rules exist at the
intersection of dynamic changes: the property owner’s planned changes
to the use of the property and the government’s changes to the
applicable regulatory regime. And they do so, expressly, by asking
whether the property owner has made sufficient investments in
reliance on being able to develop the property. 296 As one court put it
succinctly, “ ‘Reliance’ is an essential element of the [vested rights]
doctrine.” 297 Courts have reasoned that at some point in the
development process, owners need a measure of certainty and should
be able to rely on their right to develop. 298 Vested rights therefore
implicitly acknowledge that rights and expectations are dynamic, and
stability in expectations is weighed against the expectation that
property regulation will change.
Vested rights doctrine could do better than focusing on some
arbitrary moment in the development process and should instead
embrace the contours of evolutionary reliance. This approach would
examine the nature and extent of the developer’s reliance as well as the
reasonable expectations of change. For example, a developer who had
acquired property specifically for a particular development and worked
methodically through the development process only to be sandbagged
by a last-minute regulatory change should see her rights protected. But
a developer who had notice of some anticipated regulatory change, or
who had sat on land for a long time and rushed to develop only in the
face of some regulatory change, should not be able to claim a vested
right, even if he managed to get a proverbial or literal stake in the
ground. There is undoubtedly a cost to the uncertainty inherent in this
approach, but this focus on evolutionary reliance provides a more
satisfying account of the goals of the vested rights doctrine.
295. See Serkin, supra note 35, at 1284 (“[P]rotecting existing uses can induce people to alter
at least the timing of their investment decisions, if not their substance, specifically in order to
receive favorable regulatory treatment.”).
296. Delaney & Vaias, supra note 186, at 30 (“Once the landowner spends large sums of money
in reliance upon development approvals, by installing roads, utilities, and other infrastructure
improvements, or dedicating amenities such as parkland or school sites to public use, the
expectations of the developer become ‘investment backed.’ ”).
297. Exeter Bldg. Corp. v. Town of Newburgh, 980 N.Y.S.2d 154, 159 (App. Div. 2014), aff’d, 47
N.E.3d 71 (N.Y. 2016).
298. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cnty., 994 A.2d 842, 886 (Md. 2010) (Harrell,
J., dissenting); see also Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce Cnty., 913 P.2d 417, 419 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(“Washington’s doctrine of vested rights embraces a vesting principle which places great emphasis
on certainty and predictability in land use regulations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d,
133 943 P.2d 1378 (Wash. 1997).
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5. Reconciling Penn Coal and Keystone Bituminous. A
famously perplexing duo of cases is also resolved by focusing on
evolutionary reliance. In Penn Coal, the seminal takings case, the
Supreme Court held that the Kohler Act violated the Takings Clause. 299
The Kohler Act was a state law prohibiting coal companies from mining
in a way that caused certain buildings—like homes, schools, and
churches—to collapse. 300 The Court held that this was a taking of the
plaintiff coal company’s “support estate” because it effectively required
coal to be left in the ground. 301
Fast forward more than half a century to Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis. 302 The case involved a nearly identical state
law, also from Pennsylvania, that required coal companies to leave
unmined at least fifty percent of bituminous coal under certain specified
structures—like homes, schools, and churches. 303 In rejecting Plaintiff’s
takings claim, the Court went to great but unpersuasive lengths to
distinguish Penn Coal without overruling it. 304 The Court focused on
the extent of the legislature’s findings of public need in this latter case
and also refused to define the relevant property as only the coal left in
place, instead of all the coal owned by Plaintiff. 305 While this is
superficially plausible, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
Kohler Act and the later Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act are indistinguishable on any principled grounds.
While the procedural posture of the two cases may have been different,
it is hard to see why Penn Coal was not entirely controlling and
dispositive. Indeed, a number of commentators have made precisely this
point. 306
299. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police
Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV.
826, 865–74 (2006) (arguing that the case is a due process case and not a takings case at all).
300. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416–17, 421 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing statute).
301. Id. at 414.
302. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
303. Id. at 476 n.6 (describing statute).
304. Id. at 484–85 (distinguishing Penn Coal).
305. See id. at 485 (“The Pennsylvania Legislature specifically found that important public
interests are served by enforcing a policy that is designed to minimize subsidence in certain
areas.”); id. at 499:
When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the context of any
reasonable unit of petitioners’ coal mining operations and financial-backed
expectations, it is plain that petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden
of proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that property.
306. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
4–5 (arguing that Keystone “shatters any easy illusion about the unity of the law, for it marks yet
another step in the apparently remorseless expansion of state power, gutting, although not
explicitly overruling, the celebrated decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.”); John E.
Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1541
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Evolutionary reliance offers an explanation, and it is, quite
simply, the passage of time. 307 The Kohler Act was a taking because it
arose during a period of profound transition. Technological change was
reshaping the mining industry, allowing mining in ways that subjected
surface structures to a greater risk of collapse. 308 Simultaneously,
legislatures were adopting waves of new industrial and workplace laws,
many of which were invalidated by skeptical courts during the Lochner
era. 309 As one historical article framed the outcome in Penn Coal, “[T]he
legislature took a ‘populist’ stand [in protecting surface owners]; and
the Supreme Court looked toward stability, the long-run, and sanctity
of contract.” 310 These were avulsive changes to the regulatory
environment, reconfiguring the relationships between coal companies
and their workers, and between mines and the land. 311 The problem of
surface cave-ins resulting from subsurface mining had only arisen
recently. A commission studied the problem starting in 1911, and the
Kohler Act was enacted within a decade. 312 The decision, then, came at
a “critical point,” when public attitudes towards regulation had only
just “passed an invisible boundary line.” 313
Sixty-five years later, expectations around industrial regulation
had shifted. Coal companies could no longer claim that they had relied
on their ability to mine all available coal without regulatory oversight
in lots of different ways. Instead, their reliance had become tempered
over time by increasingly restrictive regulations governing mine safety,
the conditions of mining operations, and the ways in which mining

(1994) (“Despite Justice Stevens’s efforts to distinguish Pennsylvania Coal, however, many
consider the two decisions to be plainly inconsistent.”); Ron vonLembke, Comment, Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis and the Status of Coal in Pennsylvania, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 236 (1988) (“In order to retain Justice Holmes’s ‘too far’ rule while
nevertheless relying on the Mugler-Hadacheck approach, Justice Stevens had to draw fine
distinctions between the facts in Pennsylvania Coal and the facts in Keystone.”).
307. Cf. Marla E. Mansfield, A Reexamination of the Temporal Dimension in Property and
Takings, 44 TULSA L. REV. 765, 770 (2009) (“The passage of time with [a] regulation in place,
however, begins to alter perceptions about the physical nature of the property involved.”).
308. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 26–27 (1995) (describing changes
in mining practices).
309. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in
Context, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 21 (1986).
310. Id.
311. For a different focus on the role of time in defining the relevant denominator, see Danaya
C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory
Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENV’T L. 175 (2004) (arguing that owners’ actions prior to a
regulation should factor into takings analysis).
312. See Friedman, supra note 309, at 3.
313. Id. at 22.
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could occur. 314 Against these accretive shifts, the act in Keystone
Bituminous looked like much less of an interference with coal
companies’ reasonable reliance. Even though the substance of the laws
was effectively indistinguishable, and the burdens on coal companies
largely the same, the latter was not a taking because the reliance
interest had changed. Thus, Keystone Bituminous did not need to
overrule Penn Coal to reach a different result. While this does not
appear on the face of the Keystone Bituminous opinion, the Court’s focus
on the strong public justification for the Act reflects an awareness of the
shifting expectations around coal mining. The implicit reversal may not
have been a reversal after all.
6. Grandfathering and Amortization of Prior Nonconforming
Uses. Many property regulations—and especially zoning and land use
controls—grandfather existing uses of property to insulate them from
regulatory change. 315 This is often not strictly required, but is
nevertheless used precisely to protect an in-place property owner’s
reliance on the existing use of the property. 316 But at least in the zoning
context, grandfathering and amortization rules are designed to
encourage the slow demise of existing uses. 317 Prohibitions on
improvements and repairs can make an existing use increasingly outof-date, putting economic pressure on the owner to replace it with
something that conforms to the new regulations. 318 Implicitly,
encouraging a slow demise is permissible in a way that enforcing a
quick regulatory change may not be. While grandfathering protects the
property owner to some extent, these additional restrictions appear to
be designed to shift the extent of the owner’s reliance on the
314. See, e.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck & John R. Alford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The
Coal Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 745, 746–47 (1980) (briefly describing history of federal
mining laws and regulations).
315. Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 853 (1924), argues
that regulations not only do apply purely prospectively but may be constitutionally required to in
some instances. A failure to protect existing uses could lead to constitutional liability, though it is
unclear which constitutional provision a retroactive regulation would offend. Another article,
Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 741 (1930), suggests that retroactive zoning may
offend the Takings Clause.
316. Serkin, supra note 35.
317. See, e.g., id. at 1236 (describing the doctrines); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The
Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses—Balancing the Private Interest
and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 100 (1988) (“Although some
commentators forecasted a rapid demise in nonconforming uses, their prediction has proven
incorrect. One critic called this development ‘one of the greatest disappointments of the zoning
movement.’ ”).
318. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 191, at 1057; see also, e.g., Cnty. Council v. E. L.
Gardner, Inc., 443 A.2d 114, 119 (Md. 1982) (“[T]he purpose of such restrictions is to achieve the
ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical
obsolescence.”).
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nonconforming use and to encourage some alternative use. The goal is
to produce eventual compliance with new land use regulations without
interfering too much with property owners’ reliance on existing uses of
property. 319
This trade-off is even more explicit in the related doctrine of
amortization. Sometimes, local governments seeking to eliminate prior
nonconforming uses of land will not simply wait for them to die from
slow obsolescence. 320 Instead, they take a more aggressive approach and
adopt an amortization period, which amounts to a kind of time-limited
grandfathering. 321 By allowing the use to remain in place for a prespecified period, the local government can thereafter require
compliance with new regulations, without otherwise compensating the
property owner. 322
The practice is controversial. Some courts have held that a
taking in the future is still a taking and so have invalidated the
practice. 323 But most have upheld the use of amortization generally and
have focused their inquiry instead on the adequacy of the length of the
amortization period. 324 For these latter courts, amortization reflects the
intuition that deferring enforcement of a regulation is an appropriate
mechanism for realigning owners’ reliance interests over time—i.e., for
vindicating evolutionary reliance. What would be impermissible to
implement immediately can become permissible with enough advance
warning.
For one particularly insightful examination of amortization,
consider Village of Valatie v. Smith. 325 There, a municipality had
prohibited mobile homes everywhere except in predesignated mobile
home parks. 326 However, the municipality grandfathered in preexisting

319. As discussed in Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, supra note 315, at 741, much of the
hesitancy toward interference with existing uses was out of fear of takings liability. For the goals
of the closely related amortization period, see also Vill. of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y.
1994), noting “the setting of the amortization period involves balancing the interests of the
individual and those of the public.”
320. Serkin, supra note 35, at 1235.
321. Id. at 1235–36 (noting that amortization was a response to the failure of grandfathering
to remove nonconforming uses which proactively eliminates nonconforming uses after the passage
of some specified time).
322. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 191, at 1061.
323. See, e.g., De Mull v. City of Lowell, 118 N.W.2d 232, 237–38 (Mich. 1962) (holding that
Michigan municipalities had no authority to terminate nonconforming uses after a set period of
time).
324. See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 224 (N.Y. 1989) (“Presumptively,
amortization provisions are valid unless the owner can demonstrate that the loss suffered is so
substantial that it outweighs the public benefit gained by the exercise of the police power.”).
325. 632 N.E.2d at 1264 (N.Y. 1994).
326. Id. at 1265.
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mobile homes until they changed hands. 327 Twenty years after the
ordinance was adopted, the owner of one of the grandfathered mobile
homes died, and the municipality sought to enforce the mobile home
prohibition against his daughter who inherited the property. 328 She
sued, arguing that it was inappropriate to measure the amortization
period by the tenure of the property owner. 329 It meant that some mobile
homes would be grandfathered for longer than others, making
application of the zoning ordinance depend on the identity of the owners
and not on specific characteristics of the property. 330 New York’s highest
court upheld the municipality’s regulation, reasoning that it reflected
an appropriate focus on “staying in a neighborhood or remaining on a
particular piece of land.” 331 In other words, the court viewed the
ordinance as appropriately protecting existing owners’ reliance on the
ongoing use of the property, but effectively prohibited that individual’s
subjective reliance from being transferred to anyone else. Current
owners could continue to use their mobile homes throughout their
lifetimes, but their interests were nontransferable.
Whatever form amortization takes—whether measured by the
existing owner or a prespecified duration—it reflects the view that
reliance can be shaped with advance notice. The amortization period,
then, allows owners to readjust their expectations slowly over time.
This has broader consequences for transition relief more
generally. Legal change can create specific and disproportionate
burdens on some property owners. One conventional account of the
Takings Clause views it as providing relief from legal transitions. 332
Compensation, in this view, eases the cost of those transactions by
spreading the specific burdens to society as a whole.
Incorporating evolutionary reliance in property, however,
suggests that time can be an alternative to compensation. Time is its
own form of transition relief. As Jeremy Bentham anticipated,
discussing legal changes that interfered with expectations, “If it is
possible, you should so arrange matters that this law will not begin to
take effect except at a remote period.” 333 Sufficient advance notice can
minimize the burden. Amortization, then, is not a form of implicit
compensation; it does not function like monetary compensation at all.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1265–66.
330. Id. at 1266.
331. Id. at 1267–68 (later citing Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1977)).
332. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
526–27 (1986).
333. BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 149.
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Instead, it merely slows the implementation of the zoning change.
Delaying the effect of the new regulation can be enough to avoid a
takings violation because it allows for owners’ expectations to adjust
over time to the new zoning limits.
This same reasoning also justifies a new regulatory device
dubbed “prospective grandfathering.” 334 With traditional amortization,
a regulatory ban is followed by a time-limited grandfathering of existing
uses. Prospective grandfathering flips the temporal ordering, where the
ban follows the period of amortization. It is useful when governments
want to encourage an activity in the short term but then regulate it in
the future, as, for example, with natural gas and its role in climate
change. 335 Natural gas is an improvement over coal and so should be
deployed as quickly as possible, but will need to be regulated away in
the next thirty years to reduce carbon emissions even further. 336
Putting the natural gas industry on notice today that it will be highly
regulated in the future should avoid the risk of takings liability when
new regulations are ultimately adopted.
The point can be generalized, though, and highlights the role of
notice. Providing property owners with advance notice of some
regulatory change can serve as a kind of prospective amortization. 337 It
works in precisely the same way as traditional amortization, giving
owners a chance to modify their expectations over time. That kind of
advance notice allows the regulatory change to shape those
expectations gradually, so that by the time the regulation actually goes
into effect, it no longer interferes too much with reliance interests.
7. Legal Positivism and the Takings Clause. Stepping back
from these specific doctrines, evolutionary reliance solves a seemingly
intractable problem at the intersection of private property and public
power. 338 There is a long-standing fight over the nature of property
between positivists on the one hand, and natural rights theorists on the
other. Positivists argue that property rights originate with the state,
and so state law constitutes the substantive content of property rights.
Positivism in one form or another represents a mainstream view of

334. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 191, at 1061.
335. Id. at 1061–62.
336. See id. at 1021–22 (describing both the benefits and problems of natural gas).
337. See id. at 1074 (“[O]ur proposal to sunrise new regulation promises some important
benefits that go beyond just natural gas.”).
338. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property, Sovereignty, and the Public Trust, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 329, 330 (2017) (“Attempting to determine when and how change to previously
existing property rights should be accomplished by sovereign power is one of the most critical
functions of law.”).
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property. 339 For where else should one look for the content of property
than to the state laws that define one’s rights?
But positivism comes with a serious conceptual challenge. If the
state defines property rights, how can the state ever violate the Takings
Clause or otherwise interfere with property rights? That is, if property
is defined by state law, then state law cannot take property. A zoning
ordinance or environmental regulation, for example, cannot take
property because they are simply defining the contours of property
rights. This has been dubbed the “positivist trap” for property rights. 340
The alternative natural rights theory (or theories) fares no
better, however. A response to the positivist trap is to identify some
inherent content to property rights, independent of the positive content
of state law. But what is that inherent content, and where does it come
from? Here, natural law theorists struggle to find a widely accepted
answer, though many have tried. John Locke’s pre-political focus on
labor is perhaps the most well known. 341 He argued that property arises
when people intermingle their labor with resources in the world. The
state’s role is then to protect those rights. Modern proponents like Eric
Claeys continue to champion Locke’s core insights about the sources of
property rights outside the state. 342 Others like Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith have sought to identify some pre-political core of property,
in their case: the right to exclude others. 343
The fact that so much work continues to be done on these topics
reveals just how disputed they remain. And this is a challenge to
natural rights theories that counterbalance the positivist trap. Yes,
natural rights could provide a principled basis for defining the rights
that state law is not allowed to invade, but only if there is some
consensus about the source and content of those rights. Without that,
they provide no persuasive anchor for the content of property rights
against the state.
339. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1646 (2008) (“Bentham’s particular species of property positivism prefigured aspects
of modern economic approaches to property and more critical Legal Realist perspectives.”).
340. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 892
(2000) (“This approach to identifying property, which concentrates on the source of property and
imposes little or no limit on its content, gave rise to what may be called the positivist trap.”); Bloom
& Serkin, supra note 274, at 572 (discussing positivist trap). Bradley Karkkainen argued for this
reason that the Takings Clause should not apply to the states, and that the Clause is only coherent
when it applies exclusively to the federal government. See Karkkainen, supra note 299.
341. See Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV.
413, 417 (2017) (“Legal historians acknowledge that it ‘is difficult to overstate the impact of the
Lockean concept of property’ on American property law.”). See generally LOCKE, supra note 39.
342. See Claeys supra note 341, at 417.
343. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 87; Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77
NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
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The conundrum is this: If property rights arise from and are
defined by the state, then a state should be able to define its way out of
any constitutional protection of property. But if property rights are prepolitical and arise outside of law, what precisely is their content?
Focusing on evolutionary reliance provides a different kind of
answer. Property is what it has been, but subject to a process of
incremental change. This is positivism in its strongest form; the content
of property is defined by the state. But it does not fall into the positivist
trap because property rights cannot be rewritten too radically without
triggering constitutional protection. This also does not require any kind
of a priori mooring of property to some inherent source or content like
labor theory or the right to exclude. 344 Reliance on existing rules
anchors the content of property, but reliance in property is dynamic,
and not ossified in the way people have traditionally assumed.
Adherence to historical practice for its own sake is often a
blinkered view that represents a failure of imagination. 345 But
protecting reliance interests provides a new basis to ground the content
of property in past practices and becomes a reason to resist radical
change. Reliance is not simply historical anachronism but a reason to
constrain the pace of change over time.
CONCLUSION
Property is a messy and complex body of law. But it has its own
internal logic based on protecting people’s reliance on resources in the
world. Most people today think of property rights arising through
private transactions, and they defend property as an important tool for
facilitating further transactions. Reliance, however, can also arise or
subside through use and disuse. This evolutionary reliance means that
property rights are more dynamic than people typically think, even
though the dynamism is reflected across a wide swath of familiar
property doctrines. Looking closely at these doctrines reveals a more
nuanced conception of property. Instead of focusing myopically on rigid
and enduring rights of exclusion, property is better seen as the locus of
competing reliance interests. And in this vision, property law serves
specifically to constrain how quickly reliance can change. This is
344. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 646 (1994) (“Rather than universal principles,
Burke believed that political philosophy must begin with the reality of a particular society.”).
345. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990)
(“Burke is the outstanding defender of . . . the ancient but now largely discredited idea that the
past has an authority of its own which, however circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than
derivative.”); cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead.”).
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property’s central function, and it offers a new way of understanding
doctrines as diverse as the coming to the nuisance defense, the changed
conditions doctrine in servitudes, and a number of core takings rules.
This conception also serves to reassure people who are committed to
strong property rights that the institution of property is important and
enduring. But it also reassures people more mistrustful of property that
rights can and do change over time. By focusing on the pace of change,
property can protect reliance to an important extent, without rigidly
locking in the status quo. This is an altogether less familiar
understanding of the institution of property, but a more satisfying one.

